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The resilience of transport networks is attracting greater scrutiny at the international, 
national and sub-national levels. This research report explores the current state of 
knowledge about measuring transport resilience and presents a case study to address the 
question is: How resilient is the road and rail infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui 
Region? This region in New Zealand’s lower North Island provides an interesting case 
study due to its strategic location in the North Island’s and indeed New Zealand’s 
transport network.  In addition, it has experienced significant disruptions in the recent 
past, most notably widespread failures caused by flooding in 2004, and the lengthy 
closure of a significant inter-regional road connection, the Manawatu Gorge State 
Highway 3 road, due to a landslide in 2011-2012. It also provides an opportunity to 
explore this topic outside of a major metropolitan region. The region’s transport networks 
and infrastructure also have important social and economic functions.  
This research report is structured around a proposed Transport Resilience Indicator 
Framework (RIF) which explores six key dimensions of transport infrastructure resilience: 
engineering, services, ecological, social, economic and institutional. This holistic approach 
to measuring transport resilience and is envisaged to accommodate both qualitative and 
quantitative indicators.  Within this framework, data were gathered via analysis of 
secondary sources and nine key informant interviews. The interview participants were 
from public sector agencies responsible for managing aspects of the region’s transport 
network, the private sector and one social service provider. The participants had 
considerable knowledge relating to the planning of the road network and/or its economic 
and social significance. They also had knowledge of the impacts and/or management of 
recent disruptions.  
The institutions responsible for managing the region’s transport network can identify 
vulnerabilities in the network, but can also collaborate and learn from past disruptions. 
Concerns were expressed about the level of funding for maintaining and upgrading the 
region’s transport networks, particularly for territorial authorities with large networks and 
small rates bases. The region is strongly dependent on the roading network, with limited 
alternatives during roading network disruptions.  It proved difficult to quantify the 






health shuttle service provided an example of how a community, by drawing on social 
capital, was able to adapt and respond appropriately to a transport disruption. 
One key area identified for further research is assessing the capacity of private 
contractors to respond to natural hazard events of varying magnitudes. The RIF could 
also be strengthened by the use of indicators based on quantitative data, in addition to 
qualitative data. It is suggested that one method of achieving this could this could be to 
adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on expertise, methods and perspectives 
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1. Introduction and background 
Resilience is becoming a significant consideration when planning New Zealand’s transport 
networks and infrastructure. Currently, the government’s major land transport goal is to 
create “…an effective, efficient, safe, secure, accessible and resilient transport system 
that supports the growth of our country’s economy…” (Ministry of Transport, 2011b, p. 6). 
The Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Land Transport Strategy 2010 to 2040 also affords 
resilience a high priority (Horizons Regional Council, 2010). The strategy envisions the 
region’s transport network in 2040 as being: “[a] safe, sustainable and resilient transport 
system that supports economic development and lifestyle choices, with strong 
connections to national corridors” (Horizons Regional Council, 2010, p. 35). This emphasis 
on resilience in the Manawatu-Wanganui region is, in part, driven by concerns about 
predicted shocks to the region’s transport networks due to the effects of climate change 
and increases in the price of oil (Horizons Regional Council, 2010). The former is expected 
to lead to more intense and frequent heavy rainfall events causing more frequent floods, 
landslips, and other disruption to the transport network, while the latter could increase 

















Figure 1.1 The Manawatu Gorge landslip photographed during remediation works. 






Perhaps one of the main drivers for this emphasis is that the Manawatu-Wanganui region 
has also had its share of recent disruptions. This includes a significant flood in 2004, in 
which bridges were destroyed and State Highways 1, 2 and 3 were blocked (Lloyd, 2009). 
In total, about 9300 kilometres, or half of the region’s road network, was closed 
(Kumaran, 2004). In July 2013, a 30-metre landslip occurred 15 kilometres north of 
Dannevirke and undermined the rail line between Manawatu-Wanganui and Hawke’s Bay 
(Ellingham, 2013). The line was closed for more than a month (Ellingham, 2013). 
Additionally, the 2011 to 2012 State Highway 3 Manawatu Gorge closure was one of the 
most significant and lengthy disruptions to New Zealand’s state highway network in 
recent times.  
The Manawatu Gorge road was closed after it was blocked by a large landslip (Figure 1.1) 
on August 18, 2011 (Forbes, 2011). Several smaller slips and concerns over the stability 
of the hillside exacerbated the situation (Forbes, 2011). The road was not fully re-opened 
for more than 12 months (Radio New Zealand, 2012). Two alternate routes, the Pahiatua 
Track and Saddle Road (Figure 1.2), were used while the gorge was closed. These routes 
are winding, longer and less direct and the latter route crosses very steep terrain. These 
routes were not designed for high volumes of traffic (MacIntyre, 2012) and there were 
significant delays (Forbes, 2011; MacIntyre, 2012). The closure severed the main road 
link for the movement of freight between the Port of Napier and the Hawke’s Bay region 
to the east and the Manawatu-Wanganui region to the west (MacIntyre, 2012) (Figure 
1.3).  
 
Figure 1.2 Map showing the State Highway 3 route east from Palmerston North through 
the Manawatu Gorge in red, the Saddle Road route in blue, and the Pahiatua Track route in 







Figure 1.3 Map showing the location of key state highways and the Manawatu Gorge in 
the lower North Island. (Image: Google Earth (n.d.)) 
 
This was particularly problematic for the logistics and supply chain sector, and is a serious 
concern for the regional economy (Palmerston North City Council, 2010). As of 2011, in 
the Manawatu-Wanganui region, the logistic and supply chain sector generated an income 
of $294 million and provided over 6,000 jobs, accounting for nearly 11% of total regional 
employment. In fact, the sector has been one of the fastest-growing sectors in the region, 
with a 54% increase in employment between 2000 and 2011 compared to a regional 
average of 18% (Palmerston North City Council, 2011). As Palmerston North City Council 
(2011) points out, the strong performance of the logistics and supply chain sector relies 
heavily on the central location of Manawatu-Wanganui and the ease of access to 
neighbouring regions (Wellington, Taranaki, Wairarapa and Hawkes Bay) afforded by the 
road, rail and air transport infrastructure (Palmerston North City Council, 2011). 
Therefore, ensuring the hazard resilience of the key freight routes such as State Highways 
1, 2 and 3 is of paramount importance to the continued growth of the sector.  
The Manawatu Gorge also provides a key rail link between the east and west of the lower 
North Island (Figure 1.4) but this is vulnerable to landslips. In September 2010, a landslip 
caused a train carrying milk from Hawke’s Bay to Taranaki to derail (Duff, 2010). Freight 
trains had to take a much longer route between Napier and Wellington, or alternately 
freight had to be transferred onto trucks for part of the journey unrtil the line was cleared 
















Figure 1.4 Map showing Kiwirail’s North Island network. (Image: Kiwirail (2013). 
 
Apart from the transport corridor in the Manawatu Gorge, some other important routes 
are also susceptible to hazards. For example, Fitzherbert Bridge is currently the only road 
link across the Manawatu River in Palmerston North. Moreover, the Bridge also includes 
infrastructure for other essential services such as sewerage, water, electricity and 
telecommunications. Although the Bridge is structurally resilient to hazards, with the 
ability to withstand a one-in-500-year flood and one-in-2500-year earthquake, it is 
estimated that the destruction of or severe damage to the Bridge by an adverse event 
could lead to a social-economic loss of $430,000 per day (Rankin, 2012).  
The Manawatu-Wanganui region’s transport network comprises just over 7800km of local 







highway administered by the New Zealand Transport Agency (New Zealand Transport 
Agency, n.d.-c). The majority of local roads traverse rural areas and a significant 
proportion of these are not sealed (Figure 1.5). 
 
Figure 1.5 The composition of the roading network in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region. 
(Source: New Zealand Transport Agency (n.d.-c)).  
 
The Manawatu-Wanganui Region also hosts some significant state highway routes, such 
as State Highway 1, connecting Wellington in the south to Auckland in the north, and part 
of State Highway 2, which connects the region with Napier and Hastings to the east 
(Figure 1.6). State Highways 3 and 4 provide vital links when State Highway 1 is closed. 
Other state highway routes in the region are deemed to be of less significance.  
A joint transport study has been carried out by NZTA and relevant local authorities 
covering the Palmerston North and Manawatu areas. This study identified a need for a 
new bridge over the Manawatu River near Palmerston North (Figure 1.7) to enhance route 
security (Horizons Regional Council, 2010). The new bridge will be upstream of the 
existing Fitzherbert Bridge. It will not only help ensure the free flow of traffic within 
Palmerston North by sharing the traffic demand on Fitzherbert Bridge, but also improve 
the local road network’s hazard resilience by providing an alternate route to road traffic 








Figure 1.6 Classification of the State Highway network.  
Source: New Zealand Transport Agency (n.d.-a) 
 
The Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Land Transport Strategy (RLTS) also identifies the 






efficient intra- and inter-regional accessibility and links with national roading corridors” as 
a key policy (Horizons Regional Council, 2010, (p. 56)). To achieve this, the RLTS not only 
proposes to implement the recommendations of the aforementioned joint transport study, 
but also to carry out safety realignments on strategic routes such as State Highway 1 
Ohingaiti to Makohine and State Highway 2 at Manawatu Hill (Horizons Regional Council, 
2010).  
 
Figure 1.7 Proposed road hierarchy in the Palmerston North-Manawatu Strategic 






The RLTS also supports the efficient and effective movement of freight as its policy. It 
aims at establishing and maintaining freight corridors that are “resilient to disruption from 
adverse weather and other hazards”. Ensuring the availability of alternate routes is also 
considered crucial to minimising disruption to freight flow in the case of adverse events 
(Horizons Regional Council, 2010).  
The aforementioned transport disruptions and the objectives of efforts such as the joint 
strategic study highlight the vulnerability of transport networks and draw attention to 
methods of assessing their resilience. Resilience has been defined as “…the capacity of a 
system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function and structure” (Walker, 
Salt & Reid, 2006, as cited in Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2009, p. 6). In order to develop 
better transport networks which can cope with external shocks, such as natural hazards, 
methods of assessing resilience should be developed to better inform planning and 
investment decisions. This is particularly important given the expected consequences of 
climate change and its association with natural hazards. The purpose of this research is to 
explore the current state of knowledge on transport resilience assessment and present a 
case study example incorporating an assessment of the resilience of the road and rail 
infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region? The New Zealand Transport Agency has 
recently commissioned research into measuring the resilience of transport infrastructure 
(Hughes & Healy, 2014). This project adds to the developing body of knowledge about 
transport resilience in New Zealand by providing a case study of a region outside the 
major metropolitan areas of New Zealand. 
Section two discusses the relevant literature on transport resilience issues and efforts to 
measure the resilience of transport infrastructure. Section three explains the methodology 
employed in this research project to explore the topic, including the proposed Transport 
Resilience Indicator Framework (RIF). Section four presents the data gathered during this 
project. Section five is a discussion of the data with reference to the RIF. Section six is a 







2. Transport resilience - Literature review 
There is a small body of research on transport resilience and its assessment methods. 
Institutions responsible for providing and maintaining transport networks and for natural 
hazards planning have also published material on these topics. This material informs this 
research and helps to develop a framework for measuring the resilience of the road and 
rail infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui region. This review focuses firstly on 
literature on contemporary challenges to transport networks and the impact of transport 
disruptions. The next section reviews the literature on the definitions of resilience in the 
context of transport planning, the work that has been done in this area in New Zealand 
and the current state of knowledge relating to methods of assessing the resilience of 
transport infrastructure. 
2.1 Challenges facing transport networks 
Disruption to transport networks can be caused by events such as vehicle crashes, 
infrastructure and utilities failure, road works, industrial accidents, deliberate sabotage 
and natural hazards (Jenelius & Mattsson, 2012). Disruptions vary in their spatial and 
temporal extent, with some, such as vehicle crashes and road works, usually causing only 
short term disruption to a single part of the network, and others, like natural hazards, 
potentially causing more widespread problems (Ibid.). The United Kingdom’s Department 
for Transport (2014) released a review of the resilience of that country’s transport 
networks to extreme weather events following a particularly severe series of storms in 
winter 2013/2014 which caused several significant transport disruptions. Key findings 
include: authorities need to collaborate to identify critical routes and infrastructure; 
adequate funding must be available for maintenance, and to develop weather resilience 
and climate change adaptation plans; contingency plans must be tested and revised after 
disruptive events to reflect lessons learned; the economic rationale for investing in 
transport resilience must be strengthened;  and communication with network users  
needs to be improved to enable them to make informed decisions about travelling during 
adverse weather events (Department of Transport, 2014). Extreme weather events 
represent just one of the hazards the Manawatu-Wanganui region is exposed to. The most 
significant hazards include particularly earthquakes, floods, landslides and volcanic 
eruptions (Gordon & Matheson, 2008a; Lloyd, 2009) which clearly can affect the road 
network.  
Disruption to transport networks can have significant social, environmental and economic 
impacts. In New Zealand, transport networks are recognised as ‘lifelines’; “…those 






2008a, p. 18). In severe cases, a disruption could inhibit emergency services from 
reaching people in need (Jenelius, 2009; Jenelius & Mattsson, 2012). But most often the 
normal functioning of households and businesses is hampered, with transport delays 
resulting in disruption for the former and additional costs, delayed freight and potential to 
lose customers for the latter (Jenelius, 2009; Jenelius & Mattsson, 2012). Disruptions to 
key road infrastructure can have significant implications for traffic patterns and traveller 
behaviour, such as affected motorists cancelling planned journeys or changing 
destinations (Zhu, Levinson, Liu, & Harder, 2010). 
2.1.1 Ageing transport infrastructure and funding shortfalls 
Many New Zealand regions face particular challenges with ageing transport infrastructure 
and funding shortfalls. These challenges were identified in the Auditor-General’s 2013 
audit of the transport sector. The report notes that New Zealand is considered to be at 
high risk of natural hazards and that there are many recent examples, such as the 
Manawatu Gorge landslip and Christchurch earthquakes, of natural hazard events 
damaging transport networks (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013). There are significant 
direct costs involved in recovering from these events, but the indirect costs caused by an 
inability to respond or a slow recovery can have considerable long-term economic impacts 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2013).  
Many local authorities, particularly those outside the major metropolitan areas, will also 
face transport funding pressure in the near future as a result of changed levels of central 
government co-investment and shift of investment away from smaller population centres. 
A significant proportion of central government road transport funding for new and 
improved infrastructure is being allocated to Roads of National Significance (RONS), which 
are in or adjacent to major cities. In 2009/2010, 23.4% of funding for new and improved 
state highway infrastructure was allocated to these projects, and this increased to 61.8% 
in 2011/2012 (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2009, p. 24). Over the same period, the 
total funding allocated to new and improved infrastructure for local roads was reduced by 
26.1% (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2009, p. 24). In 2011, the Ministry of Transport 
reported that Auckland was receiving almost half (46%) of the government’s total 
transport funding (Ministry of Transport, 2011a). The Government Policy Statement (GPS) 
on Land Transport Funding argues that the RONS project is justified as these sections of 
state highway carry disproportionately high volumes of traffic, including heavy vehicles. 
“Investing in these routes will ease the most significant pressure points in the national 
network, reduce congestion in and around our five largest metropolitan areas, improve 
road safety and link our major sea and airports more effectively into the State highway 






funding too, such as restoring Christchurch’s earthquake-damaged transport networks, 
which could cost $400 to $500 million and might lead to reprioritisation of transport 
funding (Ministry of Transport, 2011a, p. 22). In 2014, the government released the draft 
GPS 2015, which shows some rebalancing between funding for different regions. For 
example, the draft GPS includes a $212 million package for 14 regionally important State 
Highway projects in non-metropolitan regions such as Manawatu-Wanganui, Otago and 
Taranaki (Ministry of Transport, 2014). However, with 54% of funding still allocated to 
state highways, the draft GPS has been criticised for its continued bias against local roads 
and alternative forms of transport, which receive 21% and 11% of total funding 
respectively (Burgess, 2014; Fox, 2014).  
The Auditor General’s (2013) report states:  
There is a risk that funding decisions made nationally do not consider the 
competing needs of all regions. The Government is prioritising Roads of 
National Significance and the Canterbury rebuild. This creates funding 
pressures in other aspects of the NLTP [National Land Transport Plan]. Local 
authorities rely heavily on central government subsidies for work on roads. 
Some local authorities have ageing roading networks and have to decide how 
best to maintain those assets as they will not receive all of the subsidies they 
anticipated from central government through the National Land Transport 
Fund (p. 14). 
Funding shortfalls could lead to rates rises, reduced levels of service and maintenance or 
the cancellation of planned projects (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013). In some areas, 
such as Southland District, a large proportion of the road network will reach the end of its 
projected service life in the near future, meaning significant funding will be needed just to 
maintain current levels of service (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013).  
Some non-metropolitan regions are arguing for more funding for regionally important 
state highways. For example, Venture Taranaki has recently published a report on options 
to improve parts of State Highway 3 in north Taranaki, which connect the region with 
Waikato and Auckland. The report states: 
Our review of the government’s transport funding policies highlights a potential 
imbalance of priorities away from regional investment. At present the policy of R 
[regional] funds provides a minimum level of funding for regions that can help 
offset any potential imbalance, but it is possible that these will not exist past 2015. 
Prevailing methods to prioritise investments are geared to only address certain 
kinds of transport problems. They do not routinely deal well with addressing 






levels some regional projects may be forgone at the expense of inferior value for 
money projects in the major centres (Venture Taranaki, 2012, p. 49). 
The report also argues that state highways in non-metropolitan regions can be important 
alternate routes when major state highways are disrupted and can also play an important 
role in enabling access to co-located infrastructure, such as gas pipelines (Venture 
Taranaki, 2012). The report also argues that low-quality routes prone to closure can 
suppress regional economic development (Venture Taranaki, 2012). 
There are other potentially significant funding changes on the horizon. This includes the 
proposed phasing out of regional or ‘R’ funds from 2015 mentioned above (Horizons 
Regional Council, 2012; Northland Regional Council, 2013; Otago Regional Council, 2012) 
and the review of the Funding Assistance Rates (FAR) scheme, which has confirmed that a 
new funding framework will be introduced (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a).  
The R funds were raised via a 5 cent per litre increase in fuel excise duty and were 
allocated to regions on a per-population basis (Horizons Regional Council, 2012). They are 
due to expire on March 31, 2015 (Ministry of Transport, n.d.). The funds were allocated to 
projects via regional transport committees, with the NZTA having the final decision on 
whether to approve the spending (Otago Regional Council, 2012). The scheme was 
designed to ensure there was a minimum amount available to be spent on roading 
improvements in each region (Horizons Regional Council, 2012). This was to be spent on 
the highest-priority projects, with national or ‘N’ funds available for additional projects, 
albeit on a nationally-contested basis (Horizons Regional Council, 2012; Northland 
Regional Council, 2013). As of 2012, the total ‘R’ funds allocated to the Manawatu-
Wanganui Region were $116.8 million (Horizons Regional Council, 2012, p. 42).  
The impending removal of this funding has raised concerns for several non-metropolitan 
regions about its impact on economic development and transport resilience  For example, 
Northland Regional Council (2013) argues:  
Regional funds have proved to be a vital funding source for those regions that have 
worthwhile and economically viable transport improvement projects that are 
generally not considered to be of sufficient national priority to compete for “N” 
Funds (p. 7).  
Representatives of several non-metropolitan regional councils met with the Minister of 
Transport in August 2013, and called on him to “acknowledge that on-going incremental 






growth and productivity throughout the country, as well as ensuring on-going resilience in 
the land transport network. This will not occur if they need to compete against RONS” 
(Northland Regional Council, 2013, p. 8). The Minister of Transport indicated that future 
funding mechanisms will be investigated and considered before the expiry of ‘R’ funds 
(Ministry of Transport, n.d.).  
 
Figure 2.1 Overall effective FAR rate for Horizons Regional Council and constituent 
territorial authorities 2012-2013.  
Source: New Zealand Transport Agency (2013a) 
 
The FAR represents the proportion of funding territorial authorities and regional councils 
receive from central government’s National Land Transport Fund towards the total cost of 
various transport activities, such as maintaining and improving local roads, providing 






Regional Council, 2014). Councils receive different overall effective FAR rates (Figure 
2.1). 
The FAR scheme was reviewed because the government considered that it was outdated, 
overly complex and unwieldy to administer (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a). The 
NZTA has confirmed that a new FAR framework will be phased in over a nine-year period 
from 2015. Under the new scheme, the NZTA has proposed an overall co-investment rate 
of 53%, meaning that on average 53% of local transport projects will be funded via the 
National Land Transport Fund (NLTF). In reality, however, the actual rate is expected to 
be 52% for most councils, with the rest receiving a targeted enhanced FAR, which would 
be higher than 52%. According to the NZTA:  
In determining which councils get higher funding assistance rates we will take into 
account differences in local authorities’ ability to raise the local share of the costs of 
achieving land transport outcomes [emphasis in original].” (New Zealand Transport 
Agency, 2013a, p. 6). This change in FAR could have considerable impact on 
territorial authorities’ roading budgets, creating both winners and losers. Within the 
Manawatu-Wanganui region, it is likely that apart from Palmerston North City 
Council and Horowhenua District Council, all the other territorial authorities would 
face reduced funding as they have consistently received FAR significantly above 
52% previously (Table 2.1) (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a).   
Changes to emergency reinstatement funding were also considered as part of the FAR 
review (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a). This scheme is an important factor in the 
resilience of the roading network:  
The role of those rates is to address the situation where an approved organisation 
has incurred significant expenditure in responding to 'out of the ordinary' short 
duration natural events, that is, natural events that a particular approved 
organisation could not reasonably be expected to plan and manage for as part of 
normal best practice management of the resilience of the land transport network 
(New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a, p. 61).  
The NZTA says the current scheme is intended to apply to major, short-duration natural 
hazard events, though there is a lack of clarity on what comprises a ‘major’ event and this 
may result in some funding being directed to responding to relatively common events in 
the location where they occur (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013a). Transport 
managers should instead be encouraged to plan for and manage these relatively common 
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Source: New Zealand Transport Agency (2013a) 
 
Under the current proposal, the FAR may be increased for emergency works, which are a) 
caused by out of ordinary short duration natural events, and b) greater than 10% of the 
council's approved road maintenance, operations and renewals programme for the 
relevant year (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013b). The elevated emergency rates are 
expected to be 20 percentage points higher than the normal FAR (52%) (New Zealand 
Transport Agency, 2014). This change may have an impact in the Manawatu-Wanganui 
region as some councils, such as Ruapehu District Council, Wanganui District Council and 
Tararua District Council, have required emergency reinstatement funding every year 
between the 2009/10 year and the 2012/13 year (New Zealand Transport Agency, 
2013a). 
2.1.2 Demographic and geographic factors 
Demographic and geographic factors may also influence the challenges territorial local 
authorities face in providing transport infrastructure. In the Manawatu-Wanganui region 
there is considerable variation in these factors between the territorial authorities. For 






populations and lower rates revenue have significantly longer road networks than do more 
highly populated areas with larger rates bases, such as Palmerston North and Wanganui. 
A very similar pattern emerges with the data on road bridges (Figure 2.3). This raises 
some questions around the ability of the territorial authorities with smaller populations 
and rates bases to maintain and/or improve their road networks relative to the urban 
centres.  
 
Figure 2.2 Local road network length and population size for the main territorial 
authorities in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region. The size of each bubble indicates relative 
rates revenue for the 2012/13 year.  
Sources: Statistics New Zealand (n.d.), New Zealand Transport Agency (n.d.-d), Tararua 
District Council (2013), Ruapehu District Council (2013), Palmerston North City Council 
(2013), Manawatu District Council (2013), Horowhenua District Council (2013), Wanganui 







Figure 2.3 Number of road bridges and population size for the main territorial authorities 
in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region. The size of each bubble indicates relative rates 
revenue for the 2012/13 year. 
Sources: Statistics New Zealand (n.d.), New Zealand Transport Agency (n.d.-d), Tararua 
District Council (2013), Ruapehu District Council (2013), Palmerston North City Council 
(2013), Manawatu District Council (2013), Horowhenua District Council (2013), Wanganui 
District Council (2013) and Rangitikei District Council (2013). 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Proportions of the local road network of each major category for the main 
territorial authorities in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region.  






However, it must be noted that there are clear differences in the nature of the road 
networks between these areas as well. For example, Figure 2.4 shows that Palmerston 
North’s local road network is largely made up of urban sealed roads, while Ruapehu 
District’s network is dominated by unsealed rural roads. This, along with the variation in 
population distribution also indicates that different levels of service are required between 
these different local road networks. Nevertheless, it remains true that the smaller 
territorial local authorities in the region have to manage significantly larger road networks 
with a smaller rates base to draw upon. Currently, the smaller territorial authorities with 
large roading networks also tend to receive higher roading subsidies from central 
government. However, the FAR review will result in changes to the way these subsidies 
are provided (Horizons Regional Council, 2013).  
2.2 Defining resilience in the context of transport 
The concept of resilience has its origins in the field of ecology (Davoudi, 2012; Reggiani, 
2012), but more recently it has spread to other fields. There are two major 
interpretations. The first, ecological resilience, refers to the degree of disturbance a 
system can absorb before being forced to move from its previous state of equilibrium to a 
new one (Davoudi, 2012; Reggiani, 2012). The other, engineering resilience, is concerned 
with the time required for a system to return to its original state of equilibrium following a 
disturbance. Bruneau et al. (2003) argue a resilient system has the following properties:  
Reduced failure probabilities … Reduced consequences from failures, in terms of 
lives lost, damage, and negative economic and social consequences … Reduced 
time to recovery (restoration of a specific system or set of systems to their ‘normal’ 
level of performance) (p. 736). 
The New Zealand Transport Agency (2012) defines resilience in the context of transport 
systems as “…the ability of network infrastructure to deal with a range of significant 
disruptions and shifting circumstances from natural disasters to changing demographics 
or economic shocks” (para. 4). According to Gordon and Matheson (2008a), resilience 
“relates to the ability of a roading network to continue to support the community and 
meet the community’s social, economic and environmental needs, following a major 
hazard event” (p. 73). Thus, a resilient transport system should be able to absorb shocks 
as well as accommodate slow onset long-term events such as the effects of climate 
change, and/or adjust and accommodate the needs of users quickly and effectively 






2.3 Current projects in New Zealand 
Some work has been carried out in New Zealand to assess and improve the resilience of 
transport networks. ‘Lifelines’ projects and groups have been established in most regions 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, n.d.). These groups are made up 
of volunteer members, such as representatives from various regional utility operators 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, n.d.). Their role is “…the 
identification and quantification of hazards and their likely impact on identified vulnerable 
infrastructural assets” including transportation networks (Gordon & Matheson, 2008a, p. 
31). However, a 2008 survey of coordinators of these groups found that in many regions 
there was a perception that very little funding had been put towards improving the 
resilience of the road network (Gordon & Matheson, 2008a, p. 70). Specifically, among 
local authorities there was a “very low level of funding for specific works to mitigate or 
improve the transport network’s resilience to natural hazards” (Gordon & Matheson, 
2008b, p. 22) The groups were expected to create ‘disaster resilience summaries’ to aid in 
disaster planning and to strengthen infrastructure. This led to a need for a “systematic 
resilience based framework” to help asset managers better understand resilience, identify 
weaknesses and plan accordingly (Gordon & Matheson, 2008a, p. 73). Gordon and 
Matheson (2008b) found further work was needed “in defining resilience measures, 
against which the effectiveness of different investments in strengthening, risk reduction or 
readiness could be assessed” (p. 43).  
Assessing the resilience of New Zealand’s infrastructure networks, including transport 
networks, is currently a priority for the National Infrastructure Unit (Fairclough, 2013). 
The establishment of this priority has been driven by the National Infrastructure Plan 
2011. The plan expresses the vision that: “New Zealand’s infrastructure is resilient and 
coordinated and contributes to economic growth and increased quality of life” (New 
Zealand Government, 2011, p. 11). Resilience is one of the plan’s guiding principles. That 
plan says New Zealand’s infrastructure networks should be “able to deal with significant 
disruption and changing circumstances” (p. 14).  
However, the plan also notes that one of the key challenges is that there is “insufficient 
knowledge of network resilience at a national level” (p. 2). Efforts are now being made to 
bridge this knowledge gap before the next iteration of the plan is published in 2015 
(Fairclough, 2013). Resilience analysis is currently a key priority (Fairclough, 2013). The 
2011 National Infrastructure Plan tended to focus on the major urban centres of 
Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington (New Zealand Government, 2011), but there is 
now some evidence of a greater recognition of the contribution other regions make to the 






2.4 Research in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region 
Authorities in the Manawatu-Wanganui region have sought to identify natural hazards and 
their likely effects, including on the transport system. The New Zealand Transport Agency 
(n.d.-b) has identified four sections of the region’s state highway network which have 
potential resilience issues. They are: State Highway 1 Turangi to Waiouru, which can be 
affected by snow and ice, the Whirokino Bridge on State Highway 1 near Foxton, which is 
identified as a substandard bridge for High Productivity Motor Vehicles, the Manawatu 
Gorge State Highway 3 route, which is at risk of landslides and rockfalls and State 
Highway 56 Tiakitahuna to State Highway 57, which at risk of flooding.  
The Manawatu Gorge is considered to pose the most significant resilience challenges 
because of the lack of a viable alternate route. It was also more likely to be closed for 
longer periods following an adverse event than the three other sites. The sites were given 
an overall resiliency ranking of high, medium or low, with a high ranking indicating “…that 
there is a high likelihood that an event will have a significant impact on the operation of a 
route” (New Zealand Transport Agency, n.d.-b). The Manawatu Gorge’s overall resilience 
rating was medium, whereas the other three sites in the region had a low rating.  
Nationally, the sites with high rankings were located in either the three major cities, or 
nearby in adjoining regions. As of 2008, work completed as part of the region’s lifelines 
project included Geographic Information Systems mapping of hazards (Gordon & 
Matheson, 2008a). In 2009, Horizons Regional Council published a hazard risk 
assessment report to inform a review of the region’s Civil Defence Emergency 
Management plan (Lloyd, 2009). The report considered the implications of several hazard 
scenarios, including their impacts on the transport system. It considered a landslip forcing 
a three-month long closure of the Manawatu Gorge (Lloyd, 2009) (a much shorter 
duration than the closure in 2011 to 2012). This work, along with Gordon and Matheson’s 
(2008a) findings, indicates that work has been done to identify natural hazards which 
could affect the transport network in New Zealand and the Manawatu-Wanganui region. 
However, more work is needed to develop methods to measure the resilience of the 
network. 
Research in the Manawatu-Wanagnui Region has highlighted the economic importance of 
the road transport network. The freight and logistics sector is of increasing importance to 
the local economy. The rate of growth in these sectors outstripped the national average in 
the past decade (Figure 2.5). A proposal to construct a $20 million inland port and freight 










Figure 2.5 Change in total employment in the distribution and transport sectors in 
Manawatu and New Zealand, 2000 to 2009.  
Source: Statistics New Zealand (n.d.) cited in Palmerston North City Council (2010) 
 
Palmerston North has also been identified as a key retail destination for residents of many 
smaller towns near the city. A study commissioned by the Palmerston North City Council 
in 2003 found the city’s retail sector was substantially larger and more diverse than that 
of other nearby towns like Dannevirke and provincial cities like Wanganui (Marketplace 
New Zealand, 2003). This makes Palmerston North an attractive retail destination for 
people in a large catchment area around the city. The study found that the average 
Palmerston North general merchandise retailer could expect that 25 to 30 per cent of 
their business would come from customers living outside the city (p. 12). This underlines 






Other work has quantified some of the costs of disruptions like the 2011 to 2012 
Manawatu Gorge closure. Reinstating the State Highway 3 Manawatu Gorge road after the 
slip cost $21.5 million according to the New Zealand Transport Agency’s National Land 
Transport Plan 2012/2015 (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013c, p. 3), with a further 
$4.5 million earmarked for work on improving alternate routes (p. 4). However, the local 
economy benefited from the work because Palmerston North-based company Higgins was 
the lead contractor for clearing the slip (Higgins, n.d.). The closure also meant local 
freight and logistics firms had to spend more on fuel and wages. Early in the closure 
period, Vision Manawatu estimated these costs at $20,000 and $8,500 per day, 
respectively (Forbes, 2011). Much of this additional spending would have benefited the 
local economy overall, even though individual businesses would have suffered. Other 
recent transport disruptions have also been costly, with the initial cost of repairing roads 
and council infrastructure after the 2004 floods in the region put at $120 million 
(Kumaran, 2004, p. 4)  
There is also evidence that these events have influenced businesses’ future planning. For 
example, the risk of future disruptions to the Manawatu Gorge was cited as part of the 
rationale for Fonterra’s planned expansion of its Pahiatua milk processing facility 
(Fonterra Co-operative Group, 2013). Under the proposal, all milk that is currently 
transported by rail from Oringi, near Dannevirke, to Whareroa, near Hawera in Taranaki, 
would instead be taken by tanker truck to Pahiatua (Fonterra Co-operative Group, 2013). 
One of the key drivers was:  
Reduced transport risks with milk being processed locally than relying on 
transportation to sites in Taranaki. This is especially important given the situation 
with the recent Manawatu Gorge slip (Fonterra Co-operative Group, 2013, p. 35). 
Transport disruptions also affect people. Those in outlying areas who depend upon road 
transport to get to work or to access services are particularly vulnerable. Significant 
numbers of people from smaller towns commute to work in Palmerston North, while 
others may need to travel to the city to access facilities (Cheyne & Imran, 2010). For 
example, Palmerston North hosts the region’s major hospital (Midcentral District Health 
Board, n.d.) and has several significant tertiary education institutions (Palmerston North 
City Council, n.d.).  
2.5 Measuring resilience 
The need for robust methods to measure transport infrastructure or network resilience is 






vulnerability analysis, Taylor (2012) says: “Transport agencies need well-defined concepts 
and validated models and tools to test networks for their robustness and resilience to 
failure at different locations, as an integral part of network design and incident 
management planning, and indeed planning for emergencies” (p. 761).  
Research funded by the New Zealand Transport Agency on measuring the resilience of 
transport infrastructure identified two dimensions of resilience: technical and 
organisational.  (Hughes & Healy, 2014). Each dimension has three principles associated 
with it: robustness, redundancy and ‘safe to fail’ are associated with technical resilience;  
and change readiness, leadership and culture and networks are associated with 
organisational resilience. Hughes and Healy (2014) developed a “broadly qualitative 
framework for measuring resilience” (p. 8), in which a number of measurement categories 
relating to the principles were developed. This enabled an assessment to be made and a 
resilience score to be generated, ranging from 4 for very high resilience to 1 for low 
resilience. However, the authors concluded: 
Due to project constraints, detailed real-scenario testing of the framework was not 
undertaken. Specific operator knowledge of assets and the relevant organisations 
would be required to undertake a meaningful assessment (p. 10).  
This highlights the potential value of the present case study which focuses on a specific 
region and contains detailed information from operators of the transport network.  
There have been efforts to develop methods to measuring or assess the resilience of 
transport infrastructure, with a focus on different aspects of the topic (see Table 2.2 
below). Chang and Chamberlin (2004) point to a need for assessments of the resilience of 
key lifeline infrastructure to be carried out in a multifaceted way. However, because of the 
multifaceted nature of resilience, it is difficult to develop “quantifiable, succinct, and 
meaningful” assessment tools (Chang & Shinozuka, 2004, p. 741). Bruneau et al. (2003), 
in the context of community resilience to earthquake hazards, argue that resilience has 
four key properties: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. Robustness 
refers to the strength of the system or its elements to cope with shocks without losing 
functionality or failing. Redundancy refers to the availability of alternate means of 
providing key services when there is a disruption. Resourcefulness refers to the ability to 
identify and prioritise problems and direct resources towards solving problems. Lastly, 
rapidity refers to the capacity to respond to disruptions and resolve issues quickly. 
Bruneau et al. (2003) expand on this concept by identifying four key dimensions of 
resilience: technical, organizational, social, and economic dimensions. Technical 






desired standard during a hazard event. Organizational dimensions relate to the capacity 
of institutions to improve the four properties of resilience identified above. The social and 
economic dimensions refer to the capacity to reduce social harm and economic losses 
respectively. 





Louisell & Collura (2012) 
Assessing resilience to natural hazards ex ante. A number of weighted 
variables were used to measure resilience at the individual and 
community level and to explore economic resilience and factors in the 
recovery phase. Method tested considering an earthquake scenario in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S.A.  
Serulle (2010) Measuring resilience using a number of variables and metrics and a 
fuzzy systems approach. The approach is tested using the scenario of a 
hurricane passing over Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic.  
Miller-Hooks, Zhang & 
Faturechi (2012) 
Quantitative approach to measuring the resilience level of a transport 
network “and determining the optimal set of preparedness and recovery 
actions needed to achieve this level given budget and level of service 
constraints”. Tested using various natural hazard and terrorism 
scenarios disrupting a freight network in the western U.S.A.  
Ip & Wang (2011) Quantitative approach to measuring transport network resilience. 
Method is tested using the Chinese rail network to identify vulnerable 
parts of the network.  
Omer, Mostashari & 
Nilchiani (2011) 
Quantitative, systems-model approach particularly focused on the 
differential in travel time before a disruption and after a disruption. 
Created a network model of the transport connections to Manhattan, 
New York City.  
 
Quantitative methods of assessing the resilience of transport networks and infrastructure 
have been developed by some researchers. For example, Serulle’s (2010) work examines 
a potential transport disruption using a range of metrics such as the average delay and 
reduction in network speed delays and costs to transport users (Table 2.3). Similar work 







Table 2.3  Variables and corresponding metrics used to measure transport resilience 
Source:  Serulle, 2010, p. 32 
Variable Metric 
Prevailing level of service Highway capacity manual Level of Service 
Road density Ratio between lane length and area (ln-mi/sq-mi) 
Average delay Time measure (hours or min) 
Average speed reduction % below Free Flow Speed (or speed limit) 
Personal transport cost Monetary value per length ($/mi) 
Commercial/industrial cost Monetary value per length ($/mi) 
Alternative infrastructure priority Distance between key infrastructures/links (mi) 
Level of intermodality Linguistic variable (low to high) 
Network management Linguistic variable (Level I to Level V) 
 
It appears that most methods of measuring the resilience of transport infrastructure 
developed to date are largely focused on quantitative techniques and were formulated by 
academics from fields other than planning, such as engineering. These methods certainly 
have merit; however, the challenge of achieving resilience calls for a collaborative 
interdisciplinary approach, as Godschalk (2003, p. 142) argues in the context of urban 
resilience: “If we are to take the achievement of urban resilience seriously, we need to 
build the goal of the resilient city into the everyday practice of city planners, engineers, 
architects, emergency managers, developers, and other urban professionals. This will 
require a long-term collaborative effort to increase knowledge and awareness about 
resilient city planning and design.” Perspectives from the planning profession may be able 
to complement this work. In particular, planning’s future-focused nature (Myers & 
Kitsuse, 2000) may help foster a more proactive approach. For example, Buckle (2006) 
says effective planning requires ex ante resilience and vulnerability assessment methods: 
“They indicate what the goals of planning are, what the outcomes to be driven for actually 








Table 2.4  Table of variables used to measure transport resilience  
Source: Freckleton et al., 2012, p. 4 
 
Variable Measurement Low Medium High 
Mobility index Level of service E-F C-D A-B 
Delay encountered Travel time index <1.13 1.13-1.15 >1.15 
Food medicine index [# of locations/10,000 ppl] ≤2 2-4 ≥4 
Personal transport cost index [$/km] <$0.40 $0.40-$0.47 >$0.47 
Personal mode choice Modes of transport ≤1 2 ≥3 
Network redundancy [Arterial ln-km/km2] <2 2-5 >5 
Infrastructure alignment [km] <5 >15 5-15 
Goods and material access [# of locations/10km2] <0.5 0.5-1 >1 
Commercial mode choice Modes of transport ≤1 2 ≥3 
Industrial mode choice Modes of transport ≤1 2 ≥3 
Network management Level I-II II-IV IV-V 
Fuel and energy access [# of locations/10km2] <3 3-6 >6 
Commercial transport cost index [$/km] <$0.75 $0.75-$1.00 >$1.00 
Industrial transport cost index [$/km] <$0.75 $0.75-$1.00 >$1.00 
Emergency response [hrs] >2 0.25-2 <0.25 
Resources available Disaster response contractors <10 10-20 >20 
 
A more pro-active, future-focused approach to measuring transport resilience may 
enhance engineering methods. For example, Serulle’s (2010) transport resilience 
measurement method draws on the concept of a transport resilience cycle (Figure 2.6). 
The four stages represent: 






Breakdown: The network is disrupted by a failure. 
Self-annealing: The damaged network is strengthened via “transportation 
management practices and alternative behaviours by travellers”. 
Recovery: “[F]acilities are replaced or restored and full network access is 
restored providing a return to normality or, in the case where restoration 
improves the network, to a new normality” (pp. 22-23).  
 
Figure 2.6 Transportation Network Resiliency Cycle  
Source: Serulle, 2010, p. 23.  
 
This conceptual model is useful for exploring the cycle of disruptions, improvements and 
recovery, but from a planning perspective it omits some important factors. For example, 
the model places limited emphasis on the future and it does not consider learning 
opportunities arising from adverse events. Instead, it is focused on returning to normality 
(albeit an enhanced normality in some cases). It does not consider ongoing efforts to 
enhance resilience after normality has been restored. It does not directly consider the role 
of institutions, which is an important factor in the planning literature on resilience (Buckle, 
2006; Godschalk, 2003). As Godschalk (2003) argues, resilience requires strong 







Its leaders would be aware of the hazards it faces, but not afraid to take 
risks. They would eschew simple command and control leadership, preferring 
to develop networks of leadership and initiative. They would set goals and 
objectives, but be prepared to adapt these in light of new information and 
learning. They would recognize that the quest for resiliency is an ongoing 
long-term effort. 
It is clear that developing methods for assessing the resilience of transport infrastructure 
is a complex and multifaceted task. There appears to be no widely accepted method for 
assessing road infrastructure and methods for other modes of transport appear to be 
even more scarce (Madhusudan & Ganapathy, 2011). Research in this area is also 
dominated by studies in the United States and there is an information gap for other 
countries (Madhusudan & Ganapathy, 2011). Gordon and Matheson (2008a, pp. 73-76) 
have outlined potential parameters for assessing transport network resilience in New 
Zealand: 
Resistance: How a particular transport asset would respond a hazard event, 
including the likely extent of the damage and the level of functionality after the 
event. 
Network layout: The availability of alternate routes can allow the network to 
continue to some extent if a key section is damaged. There are three major 
layouts: linear, where there is one main route and few or no alternates; 
dispersed, where there are some alternate routes but they are far apart; and grid, 
where there are many alternate routes.  
Traffic volume: Disruptive events have greater impact on sections of the 
network with higher traffic volumes and vice versa. 
Time: The likely time required to restore functionality. 
Gordon and Matheson (2008a) also note that transport disruptions impact upon 
community wellbeing. There can be social repercussions, such as inability to access 
education and health services; economic impacts, such as inability to trade or transport 
products; and environmental damage. Gordon and Matheson (2008a) argue these factors 
need to be taken into account when assessing resilience.  
From Gordon and Matheson’s (2008a) work, and the key concepts in the broader 






resilience are complex and there is no established standard method. This demonstrates 
the value of case study examples, such as in this research project, in further developing 
these concepts and testing them in a real-world setting. The literature suggests transport 
resilience assessment methodologies should take into account factors such as the spatial 
layout of the transport network and the availability of suitable alternate routes, the ability 
of key links to withstand natural hazard events, the likely time required to restore 
functionality to the network, the likely impact on traffic flows and the social, economic 
and environmental consequences. Resilience assessment tools can be used both to assess 
baseline resilience and to identify ways of improving resilience (Pettit, Croxton, & Fiksel, 
2013). 
2.6 Planning relevance  
Internationally, resilience has emerged as a key concept for planners, spurred by 
perceptions of increasing uncertainty and risk due to the expected impacts of climate 
change, fear of terrorism, recent global financial problems and other issues (Davoudi, 
2012). “Yet, it is not quite clear what resilience means, beyond the simple assumption 
that it is good to be resilient” (Davoudi, 2012, p. 299). The ‘fuzziness’ surrounding the 
concept of resilience means it may be challenging for practitioners to effectively 
operationalise (Shaw & Maythorne, 2011). In the United Kingdom, planning agencies have 
been found to be slow in developing indicators to enable resilience to be evaluated and 
monitored (Shaw & Maythorne, 2011). However, the current body of academic literature 
appears to provide little guidance to practitioners, as Wilkinson (2012) notes: “There are 
surprisingly few publications that address how a resilience approach to planning might be 
pursued in practice” (p. 320). 
Nevertheless, planning is considered to have a key role in promoting resilience (Australian 
Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities, 2013; Burby, 1998; 
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2012). Planning enables multiple 
stakeholders to collaborate “to identify known risks, needs and potential solutions” (The 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2012, p. 73). Planning should facilitate 
the inclusion of risk assessments in decision-making, the selection of appropriate 
locations for developments (avoiding hazard-prone areas) and proactive planning of 
future infrastructure needs and post-disaster recovery (The United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2012). Decisions made before, during and after adverse events 
shape the resilience of infrastructure systems (McDaniels, Chang, Cole, Mikawoz, & 
Longstaff, 2008) (see figure 2.7 below). Considering the potentially significant social and 
economic ramifications of transport disruptions (Gordon & Matheson, 2008a; Jenelius & 







Figure 2.7 Dimensions of resilience and impacts of ex ante and ex post measures  
Source: McDaniels et al. 2008, p. 312.  
 
However, in order for effective planning decisions to be made to increase resilience, good 
information is required (Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilience and Safer 
Communities, 2013). This highlights the benefits of establishing methods to measure 
resilience to inform transport planning.  
2.7 Summary 
Transport networks face a number of threats such as natural hazards and the risks of 
ageing infrastructure. This has led to interest in methods of assessing the resilience of 
transport infrastructure. Resilience in this context refers to the capacity of the transport 
system to absorb shocks, or to adjust and accommodate users’ needs rapidly. Some work 
has been carried out in New Zealand on potential interactions between natural hazards 
and transport systems. However, further work is needed to build the resilience of 
transport infrastructure. Assessing resilience is a complex task, involving multiple factors. 
But transport resilience assessments should consider the layout of transport networks, 
redundancy, the capacity of key infrastructure to withstand hazard events, the time 
involved in restoring networks after events, and social, economic and environmental 
factors. Further research in this area, such as this project, is necessary to apply and 
further develop resilience assessment methods. Doing so should help to inform planning 
decisions to create more resilient transport networks and further test and develop 







This chapter describes the methods used in this study to measure the resilience of the 
road and rail infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region. Firstly, the proposed 
Transport Resilience Indicator Framework (RIF) will be outlined. Primarily qualitative data 
will be used to inform measurements of the dimensions of resilience outlined in the RIF. 
The quantitative data in this study came from existing data sources, while qualitative data 
were gathered from in-depth, semi-structured key informant interviews. This chapter 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used as well as ethical 
considerations and the procedures to address these.  
3.1 Proposed Transport Resilience Indicator Framework 
(RIF) 
The literature review has identified that existing methods of measuring the resilience of 
transport infrastructure utilize mainly quantitative techniques and were developed by 
researchers from fields other than planning, such as engineering. However, approaching 
the task from a planning perspective might complement these efforts because a planning 
perspective might take a more future-focused approach than might, for example, an 
engineering approach, and considers a wider range of factors which can be assessed 
either quantitatively or qualitatively. Accordingly, the proposed Transport Resilience 
Indicator Framework (RIF) this study utilizes presents such a holistic approach (Figure 





 Economic; and 
 Institutional. 
By taking a holistic approach such as this, a greater number of facets of resilience can be 







Figure 3.1 Proposed Transport Resilience Indicator Framework (RIF) 
Table 3.1  Potential indicators of and data sources for the transport resilience indicator 
framework 
Dimension Potential indicators Data sources 
Engineering 
 Robustness: Is new infrastructure designed and built to an 
appropriate standard to withstand adverse events? Do design 
standards take into account slow onset events such as the 
expected effects of climate change? 
 Retrofitting/replacement: Are older, more vulnerable structures in 
important locations being systematically replaced or upgraded to 
improve performance during adverse events? 
 Rapidity: How quickly can service be restored to damaged 
sections of the transport network? Are there any barriers to rapid 













in the event of a disruption? 
 Redundancy: Are there other viable routes to move people and 




 Minimisation of harmful environmental impacts: Are infrastructure 
construction and repair works carried out in a manner which 
reduces environmental impacts? Are alternate routes/modes 
available which minimize the length of detours?  
 Ecosystem services: Are ecosystem services which may help 
prevent or mitigate natural hazards which could disrupt the 
transport network (such as vegetation helping to control erosion 








 Emergency evacuation: Has an effective evacuation plan been 
formulated? 
 Access to services: What measures have been put in place to 
ensure people, and vulnerable groups in particular, can access 
health and social services despite disruptions? 





 Redundancy: Is there a range of alternate routes or modes for 
businesses to move goods?  
 Continuity of service: 





 Risk assessment and reduction: How well are transport agencies 
identifying and reducing risks?  
 Collaboration/integration: How effectively are transport agencies 
working together and sharing information to reduce risks? Are 
they working together to manage or prevent disruptions using a 
network approach?  
 Learning: How well are transport agencies learning from past 
disruptions and improving processes as a result? 
 Policy: How well do transport policy documents and plans promote 
resilience? 
 Allocation of resources: How well do funding mechanisms for 





3.2 Data sources 
The analysis of secondary sources provided a great deal of valuable quantitative data to 
inform this research. As Hakim (1982) discusses, government agencies and other 
organisations collect a great deal of data that can aid researchers and which is available 
in archives. These repositories of data make large quantities of information available 
quickly (Hakim, 1982). Secondary data can be analysed in novel ways to inform research 






by the New Zealand Transport Agency and economic data collated by the Palmerston 
North City Council.  
In this research qualitative data were collected from key informants through in-depth 
interviews. Interviews have strengths and weaknesses. The key strength of interviewing 
is that it allows the collection of ‘rich’ data (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). This is because the 
interviewer can adapt the questions to elaborate on interesting points that are raised, and 
by discussing points one-on-one with informants there is more time and greater flexibility 
to discuss topics thoroughly (Curtis & Curtis, 2011; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The 
weaknesses include managing potentially sensitive information, the need to keep the 
discussion focused and deciphering the rich data that is gathered (Curtis & Curtis, 2011). 
However, the latter weakness can be mitigated via data management methods and issues 
with sensitive information can be managed by ensuring the participants are informed and 
comfortable with the process and the information that is revealed (Curtis & Curtis, 2011).  
The following key informants were interviewed: a Destination Manawatu Board Member, 
Tararua District Council’s Manager Strategy and District Development, a Senior Network 
Manager with the New Zealand Transport Agency, the St John Ambulance Dannevirke 
Area Committee Chairman, a Horizons Regional Council transport planner, a Mainfreight 
branch manager, Palmerston North City Council’s road planning team leader, the 
Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer and the Kiwirail Palmerston 
North area manager.  The aim of the interviews was to elicit information about social, 
economic and environmental aspects of transport sector resilience in the Manawatu-
Wanganui Region. The participants have considerable knowledge relating to the planning 
of the road network and/or its economic and social significance. They also had knowledge 
of the impacts and/or management of the 2011 to 2012 Manawatu Gorge closure. The 
gorge closure featured prominently in the interviews as it gave this project significant 
impetus and provided a case study of a significant transport disruption and subsequent 
recovery.  
Potential participants were invited to take part in the project via email and telephone 
interviews that were undertaken in August 2013. . A participant information sheet was 
emailed to each participant. The interviews were semi-structured. An interview schedule 
was written prior to the interviews and discussed with the project supervisor. The 
questions were influenced by McDaniels et al.’s (2008) work that identified aspects of 
recovery and planning to explore dimensions of resilience in systems. Some questions 






complete a consent form. The interviews were digitally recorded, with the participants’ 
consent, and then transcribed and analysed.  
Before the interviews, the author and supervisor had an informal meeting with the Chief 
Executive of Vision Manawatu to identify previous work on this subject and how this 
project might add value to that work. Another informal meeting was held with Palmerston 
North City Council’s Economic Policy Advisor to explore economic data relevant to this 
study. A significant amount of data, in the form of graphs and tables, was provided.  
3.3 Limitations 
Time constraints meant it was not possible to interview a larger number of key informants 
who might have added valuable qualitative data to this research, such as freight 
companies and staff from other councils in the region. In some cases, the short timeframe 
and lack of availability of potential interviewees was a factor. Also, not all of the data 
sought were obtained, including road crash statistics and traffic flow data during the 
Manawatu Gorge closure.  
3.4 Summary 
The research aims to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the resilience of 
land transport infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui region through both qualitative 
and quantitative data. This, in turn, is intended to contribute to a critical analysis of how 
transport sector resilience might be measured. The research involved both desktop data 









The desktop and interview data collected for this project is organised into six sections. 
Each represents one dimension of the Transport Resilience Indicator Framework (RIF) 
discussed in chapter 3. This holistic approach will enable these important factors to be 
explored in depth.  
4.1 Institutional factors 
There are several key institutions responsible for managing transport networks in the 
region. They include: The New Zealand Transport Agency, which manages the state 
highway network and is involved in key strategic transport decisions; Horizons Regional 
Council, which plays a key role in setting the region’s strategic direction for transport; 
territorial local authorities, which manage local road networks; and Kiwirail, which 
manages the rail network. This section explores how these institutions identify 
vulnerabilities in the transport network, collaborate and learn from disruptions and 
allocate resources to improve the resilience of the transport network.  
4.1.1 Identifying vulnerabilities 
The key informant interviews also explored the vulnerable parts of the Manawatu-
Wanganui transport network, including the Manawatu Gorge and other areas. The New 
Zealand Transport Agency Senior Network Manager said the Whirokino Trestle and State 
Highway 56 near Opiki had been identified as vulnerable areas. The latter is flooded on a 
relatively frequent basis, but there are alternate routes available, while work is under way 
to assess the feasibility of replacing the former, he said. The agency is involved in the 
region’s civil defence group, which enables collaboration with local authorities and utility 
providers to identify vulnerabilities. He considered that the Manawatu Gorge is likely to 
continue to pose challenges, as it is difficult to predict where and when large landslides 
may occur. He said this is due to the terrain the gorge is set in, with large amounts of 
loose rock lining the sides of the gorge as a result of erosion.  
The Horizons Regional Council transport planner indicated some other potential hazards 
that could affect the transport network: 
We also have volcanic [hazards]… not only just … at Ruapehu but at Taranaki 
as well, where the predominant wind-flow will be coming from the west so a 
lot of the ash fall will be predicted to fall [at] Wanganui-Taumaranui, 
definitely as far as Palmerston North as well. Also you look at [for example,] 
the main rail line to Whareroa, if … it got washed out at Wanganui for 






Whareroa anymore because they’ve closed the Stratford-Ohakura Line. So 
everything would have to get trucked, you would imagine to Hawera, if the 
rail line got taken out. So that’s certainly a bit of an issue with the large dairy 
component for our economy. 
However, the Horizons Regional Council transport planner said he believed the region’s 
network was reasonably resilient:  
…we are quite lucky that in the majority of our region we have quite a 
resilient network. If you go up through National Park you’ve got options. If 
State Highway 1 is closed, you can take State Highway 4 and the other state 
highways which skirt around the mountain … There tend to be… a number of 
options that people can use if there are closures and what have you. But it’s 
really that Manawatu Gorge that [has] been the issue. And of course … the 
Napier-Taihape road … has now been sealed the whole way, [which] was 
identified a number of years ago by the RTC as being an issue and … needed 
to be sealed, not only for tourism but also for heavy vehicles. So again that’s 
now complete, so that is another viable alternative route. 
The New Zealand Transport Agency considers resilience to some extent when it evaluates 
proposed infrastructure projects. The Transport Agency’s Senior Network Manager said 
projects are assessed using a benefit-cost ratio process, and resilience is considered as 
part of the ‘strategic fit’ assessment, which is designed to test how projects align with the 
strategic direction of transport investment (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013d). 
However it must be noted that resilience is only one of a number of factors, and many are 
based on economic considerations (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2013d). 
The Tararua District Manager Strategy and District Development said that the 2004 floods 
had tested the district’s transport network, including the closure of 70 roads, which had 
identified flood-prone sections of road. He said the council has been incorporating flood 
mitigation measures into road upgrades and renewals since then, such as installing larger 
diameter pipes in culverts and replacing bridges, which has improved performance during 
smaller-scale flash floods.  
The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said the council had 
mechanisms in place to identify and reduce natural hazards which could disrupt the local 
road network:  
Our asset management plan ultimately lays the template for the level of 
service that we think we should be providing. We’ve also got an established 
road hierarchy and that would influence what decisions were made in terms 






reasonably well established road hierarchy and that’s been reviewed in the 
last 18 months and we’ve had a major investment over the last 10 years of 
putting in roundabouts and traffic signals where necessary to address priority 
on some of those routes. And so we’ve probably got a much better 
functioning strategic roading network than we had 10 years ago, in terms of 
ease of getting around. And that’s been reflected in traffic volumes. [In] Cook 
St for example when we invested in the roundabouts and traffic signals down 
there we’ve more than doubled the traffic flow on that road and that really 
shows us that the road users now can use that road the way that it was 
actually intended as part of the roading hierarchy, whereas before it was 
having considerable crash problems. So by improving the intersections, the 
key nodes, we’ve actually improved the resilience of the network by making 
that road more usable by traffic and removing some of the barriers to … 
flowing traffic. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said the company kept records of potential 
risks: 
…we have a risk register which has known trouble spots and certainly if you 
look at them in terms of risks that are going to cause us disruptions, like 
whether it be landslips or dropouts or things like that, those are ranked, 
using a rating system. It’s not perfect, no system is, and sometimes we’ll get 
failures on something which is ranked a lot lower, but of course when you’re 
dealing with this type of beast you can assess a risk based on slope stability, 
soils, water ingress, all these sorts of things, but if you’ve got a cloud that 
choses to park itself over somewhere else and dump its load that changes the 
picture somewhat dramatically. It’s important to identify the risks but what 
we can’t control is the trigger event… 
He said once a potential hazard was recorded in the register funding could be sought to 
reduce it, though this was prioritised: 
…it’s a sort of a national risk thing… If we’ve got something on a very minor 
line… the consequences of a failure are perhaps not as great as some other 
routes which carry significant traffic or passengers or things like that. 
Kiwirail also had a training programme to increase staff skills in this area, he said:  
… aside from our internal, sort of in-house knowledge and in-house process… 
we’re just going through a programme of field engineering training at the 
moment where all our field engineers are going through a new course and a 
component of that is built around resilience and future proofing and so forth, 






4.1.2 Collaboration and learning 
Events such as the Manawatu Gorge closure in 2011 to 2012 also draw attention to the 
institutions responsible for managing the transport network, how well they work together 
and what they learn from such events. The Horizons Regional Council transport planner 
said that the Regional Transport Committee enabled collaboration between elected 
members from the regional council and territorial local authorities, as well as a 
representative of the NZTA. Council officers also had an important role in providing advice 
and information. Resilience was discussed in this forum as it was a key outcome of the 
current Regional Land Transport Strategy, which had aided the response to the Manawatu 
Gorge landslip: 
[O]bviously then you had the Manawatu Gorge which happened about a year 
or so after the strategy was put into place. And so that helped in terms of 
when we’re looking at the alternative scenarios, saying to NZTA: ‘Well look 
actually this is big for the region in our strategy, we need to think about how 
we are going to get the alternative… solutions put in place as quickly as 
possible’. So we can say to NZTA, ‘Look it’s our strategy, let’s work on it as 
quickly as possible’. 
Despite the concept of resilience featuring as a key outcome in the Regional Land 
Transport Strategy, it had taken time to translate into action, apart from the Saddle Road 
upgrade, he said:  
But… it’s kind of funny because I guess in 2010 [when] we started that 
resilience is kind of one of those catchwords and people were saying ‘oh 
things need to be resilient’ and whether or not people actually knew precisely 
what resilience actually meant is probably a story for another day. … [S]o 
actually the projects which have come through from then, they may not 
necessarily be looking at a resilient transport network. 
Later, in response to another question about identifying hazards which may affect the 
region’s transport network, he added: 
But yeah … I think the resiliency thing is… starting to gain a bit more of a 
focus I guess … and I think people are starting to more understand what it 
actually means. 
The Horizons Regional Council Transport Planner said council officers also had important 
relationships with other agencies: 
But … at officer level [we also have] quite a strong relationship with the 
NZTA. We’ve got the regional office here in Palmerston North so we work with 
them… pretty closely and we also … have quite a strong relationship with 






transport officers’ meetings where we meet at a central location … and we 
also have NZTA representation there at most of those meetings as well. So, 
we get a really good flavour of what’s happening not only at national level 
but also at local level through our RTC. Yeah, we do have … ongoing dialogue 
with all those people. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said the Engineering Lifelines Group also 
enabled collaboration between key institutions: 
Oh, I’m a firm believer in engineering lifelines as being a good vehicle for 
that. Having been involved in the Hawke’s Bay one a few years back, it was 
particularly good at bringing people together and forming those relationships 
and networks that are quite important when something goes bung. I think it’s 
just been one of those things that the Manawatu Engineering Lifelines Group 
… hasn’t had quite the same vigour that some other groups around the 
country have had, which is a shame because it is a good [forum]. 
The ability of different parties to collaborate can be tested during disruptions, and in the 
case of the 2011 to 2012 Manawatu Gorge closure, State Highway 3, managed by the 
New Zealand Transport Agency, was blocked and the main alternate route was the Saddle 
Road, a local road. The Tararua District Council is responsible for managing the eastern 
portion of the road. The Tararua District Council Manager Strategy and District 
Development said the council’s relationship with the New Zealand Transport Agency was 
strengthened by the event: 
We found the way it worked in terms of us providing control back to NZTA for 
that temporary time as effective for their management of the complete crisis. 
And the changeover back, it was dealt with very fairly. So … it was unusual 
but it … showed that we were partners and we recognise that NZTA had 
major interest to make sure that the state highway continued to function, or 
the network continued to function 
This productive relationship has continued after the event, he said: 
Recently [the NZTA] agreed to give our engineering services in Woodville the 
job to professionally oversee the Saddle [road upgrade] project. So that’s 
them returning the favour essentially to allow us the opportunity to make a 
difference now that it’s gone from a crisis to a more stable state. 
The New Zealand Transport Agency Senior Network Manager comments indicated that the 
agency’s relationship with Tararua District Council may have influenced its planning for 






I think the lessons learned is probably working with our local authority people 
and tell them where our risk is … [For example,] if it closed down we’ll need 
to use your local road for a longer period of time. Because at the moment if 
it’s like a day closure they’re happy… but if it’s longer than 2, 3 [or] 4 days 
you can actually see the damage on their road. That’s when they’ll start 
saying, ‘Well hang on a moment, we’ll need a bit of help here.’ So it’s just 
identifying these bits of road, working with the council and get a 
memorandum of understanding so that if this happens then we’ll take over 
and so forth. 
He said that other institutions had responded promptly while the slip was cleared and the 
road remediated, which meant the long duration of the closure was attributed to the 
magnitude of the landslip.  
I thought we fast-tracked everything. Everyone came to the party. Even 
getting the resource consent was a quicker process. There really [were not] 
any issues.  
… if you’re in a normal project, to build a new bridge would take anywhere 
from 3 to 10 years because of all the processes that we have to go through. 
But this one we built a 60 metre long bride and a 100 metre long retaining 
wall in less than 4 months. 
However, the Destination Manawatu Board Member believed the 2011 to 2012 Manawatu 
Gorge closure had shown that local authorities across the central North Island needed to 
advocate more strongly to central government: 
Well one of the learnings for me, was that it reinforced for me that the 
region, and I’m talking about not just the Manawatu, but also the Hawke’s 
Bay [and] New Plymouth, are not well organized in terms of articulating the 
strength of the issue and the solutions that should be addressed. 
Business people expressed some concerns about a perceived lack of communication 
during the closure. The Mainfreight branch manager said that while he was not sure of the 
challenges the authorities faced in restoring the road, he was not informed of what was 
happening:  
…communication about where it was at, what was happening was pretty 
poor. It was … basically non-existent, I don’t think we heard from anybody 
about what was happening or what potential decisions needed to be made or 
who was making them. 
The Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer said that communicating 






I think the biggest frustration for us was trying to get central government to 
understand the impact it was having and to try to get them up here to have a 
look. And it wasn’t just a little landslide; it was quite an enormous natural 
disaster for us as a region and for our business community. So that probably 
was the biggest frustration, trying to get them to understand that it was 
impacting. 
The Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer attributed this to the impact 
of the Christchurch earthquakes at the time:  
I think it was just terrible timing. It sounds bad but, I think if Christchurch 
hadn’t happened this would have been seen as quite a significant event, 
however you have a landslide versus a whole city crumbling – it’s really 
nothing. So I don’t think it got fixed quite as quickly or got the attention it 
would have got otherwise as quickly. 
The Destination Manawatu Board Member said a bolder solution to the Manawatu Gorge’s 
vulnerability to landslips was needed, funded by a user-pays system:  
…the way I look at it is we are dependent upon central government policies 
that determine funding priorities, and they’re largely about cost-benefit to 
determine priorities between spending and that doesn’t necessarily look at 
what the value is to the users who may well be prepared to put a dollar on 
having the route through the gorge open as distinct from using an alternative 
over the Pahiatua Track or the Saddle Road. I would suggest that the sort of 
dollars that they would be prepared to put on each trip would be talking 
dramatic improvements to the gorge as being a possibility. But that doesn’t 
fit necessarily with the way prioritising of funding occurs at the moment. 
The Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer said the Manawatu Gorge 
closure had prompted businesses to look at other modes of transport:  
Well some of them were the trains of course and then others we … were 
actually working with the airport on possibly getting stuff out on the planes. 
And then because of that we’re kind of looking at now what do we have here 
in the region, and where does it go, and how can we get it out and do we try 
and extend the runway to get freight planes in here. So … it was definitely 
bad at the time but it’s had quite some good initiatives come from that. 
4.1.3 Allocation of resources 
There were some concerns expressed about the potential impacts of changes to central 






Regional Council transport planner indicated it could have a significant effect on some 
territorial authorities, such as Tararua District Council:  
I think Tararua [has] got one of the largest… roading networks in the country 
for their size and [a] declining ratepayer base. If also they get a decline from 
[central] government for their subsidy rate then that’s going to have a double 
effect, a double whammy really for them. So, they’re asking the hard 
questions in terms of ‘hey look, do we go to just an unsealed road, let it go to 
an unsealed road?’ And that’s [going to] have a huge impact on their network 
and who knows what’s going to happen in the future? 
The Horizons Regional Council transport planner said there were also concerns about 
potential changes to emergency reinstatement funding outlined in the FAR review:  
…one of the major uncertainties around the discussion document was what 
the NZTA are going to term a major event. And that really does throw up a 
number of questions that need to be answered. Because of course you look 
at Ruapehu [District], which does get a number of big events, say you get 4 
or 5 big events… now do those 4 or 5 big events get called major events or 
are they just [classed] as business as usual? The … NZTA are… saying … a 
solution is basically that Ruapehu should set aside, for lack of a better word, 
a slush fund for emergency events, but with the Local Government Act … 
they effectively can’t do that, they need to be spending their money as 
transparently as possible and you just can’t rate for a rainy day. 
The Horizons Regional Council transport planner said there could be difficulty getting 
funding to replace ageing transport infrastructure, particularly for new capital projects:  
Yeah, I mean if it’s going to be a new capital project then there certainly 
[are] issues because most of the money for capital projects is tied up with 
Roads of National Significance. If it sort of comes to the end of its life then it 
can go through under the … maintenance and ops … category. So then things 
might be … easier. But it’s not easy because you’ve still [got to] find that 
local share component from your ratepayers and any major investment on 
infrastructure is really hard to get that local share component these days … 
And again with the FAR rates, who knows how that’s going to work out … 
particularly with your Tararuas and your Ruapehus, they’re potentially facing 
quite a large loss of subsidy from NZTA. 
The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said there was sufficient 
funding to maintain the local road network, but there were some issues with capital 
improvement projects:  
Maintaining the network is generally still well funded and resources are 






capital improvements to networks and where this probably most manifests 
itself is actually, it’s difficult for us to replace ageing structures. 
He said the Milson Line rail overbridge was an example of this:  
Ultimately the best option is to replace that bridge and next decade that’s 
coming up 100 years old, and so at some stage what tends to happen is that 
bridges get older, they lose their strength and so the level of service 
ultimately diminishes. In an ideal world the funding would be available to 
replace it. But such is the demand on the capital improvements budget that it 
probably usually takes a little bit more time. Now we haven’t tested that yet. 
We’re not yet at the stage where the bridge has got a reduced carrying 
capacity. It can’t carry overweight loads but it can carry loads to the legal 
weight restriction at the moment. So it’s operating with an acceptable level of 
service. At some stage in the future that level of service will diminish and 
we’ll have to start banning larger trucks from it. Given its proximity to the 
airport and the industrial areas that might or might not become a significant 
issue. 
The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said central government’s 
funding policy made it difficult for places like Palmerston North to acquire funding for 
capital projects:  
…any applications for NZTA funding have to be looked at from a national 
priority perspective and at the moment the government policy statement on 
road funding allocates priority based on three considerations; the efficiency of 
the solution, the effectiveness of the solution and the strategic fit of the 
solution. Probably the one we have the most trouble with in Palmerston North 
is the strategic fit because basically … our roading network in the national 
sense, is a lower priority simply because [it is] not that congested, not 
carrying such heavy loads as others, there are alternate routes available, 
those sorts of things. So the roads that are tending to get funding at the 
moment are in the heavily populated or congested networks. Our network 
generally isn’t that congested so it’s seen as a lower priority. That’s … the 
government’s funding priorities. Unfortunately … we’re in this situation where 
we’ve probably have lag funding for infrastructure investment which means 
that … roads are going to be developed after they’re needed rather than just 
in time or before they’re needed. 
He added:  
We’re probably in the situation …that many of our roading projects are 
resulting in some inconvenience to motorists. In other parts of the country 






economic activity, so at the moment we’re not yet so badly affected by 
congestion that it is a significant barrier to economic activity and the GPS is 
driven by economic activity. Congested roads ultimately cost the community 
a great deal. So in the pecking order nationally most of our roads aren’t 
stacking up. We have periods of congestion but they never last very long. 
From the city’s point of view we want to keep ahead of the game. And we’d 
prefer to accelerate some of the roading improvements we’d like to see 
because there are deficiencies … there’s trucks using routes that are 
inappropriate for their use. There’s … pedestrian and cycle safety issues that 
aren’t being addressed, but they don’t rate in a national scheme of things as 
high priority. 
The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said resilience was a 
consideration in the funding framework, but on a national level the region’s resilience 
issues were not significant:  
Take probably the most telling example that we have in Palmerston North, 
the Manawatu Gorge. When it was out for a year there were two alternate 
routes for motorists, albeit conceded they were offering a lower level of 
service. But you’re talking about a 15, 20-minute delay on a long distance 
journey in most cases. And so from the government’s perspective not really a 
significant barrier at all, sorry there’s a bit of inconvenience here, [a] 15-
minute delay. Well I think most Aucklanders would gratefully accept a 15 
minute delay if they could still get to their destination. So in those terms we 
simply don’t have the problems that other regions are having. 
Acquiring funding for preventative maintenance could also be an issue for some councils, 
the Horizons Regional Council transport planner said:  
Yeah, it is an issue … and it all … gets tied back again to the fact that they’re 
not getting funding on a national level or through their local share and 
districts are just really keeping the asset maintained to minimum level of 
service and are not doing that preventative maintenance anymore because 
they just can’t afford to. And whether or not it’s going to be an issue again in 
the future … it probably is, particularly if FARs get reduced, they just won’t 
have the funding available to do the preventative maintenance. And whether 
or not it’s too much of an issue … [Palmerston North] City Council have … 
when they haven’t got the subsidy from NZTA they have just done it 
unsubsidised works. So whether or not that is an option for some councils, it 
might be for someone like the City Council, who I guess for lack of a better 
term are a little bit more richer than some of the smaller councils and can 
afford to do that. But I think for some of the smaller councils they’re just not 






The Horizons Regional Council transport planner said that central government had 
indicated the regional or ‘R’ funds that are due to expire in 2015 would likely be retained 
in some form, though this is yet to be officially announced. Completely removing these 
funds would have a significant impact on the region, he said:  
If it did get taken out … it does have a major impact. Because some of the 
major funding we’ve had in recent years…. they have all come through with R 
funds. The way that the national prioritisation of projects now works with 
projects at the top levels getting N funds first and then if they still stack up 
they’ll get R funds, potentially means that you might not be spending any of 
your R funds any time soon... So there’s a real issue that the projects that 
the regions want aren’t going to get funding at all. But as I say, I think the R 
funding mechanism will still be there, so… it’s not official yet, but I think 
there’s a very good chance. 
The austere funding environment had led to innovative and collaborative responses from 
local government, the Horizons Regional Council transport planner said:  
…basically after the last GPS where it was indicated that your maintenance 
and ops for local government was basically flat-lined across the country, 
Local Government New Zealand came up with an idea to get this Roading 
Efficiency Group together and to get key players in the industry to say, ‘Hey 
look, we’ve got this problem of basically flat-lined cost for maintenance and 
ops, how do we get better bang for our buck?’ And one thing which has come 
up through that is this Roading Efficiency Group and they’re working [in] all 
TAs or most TAs and we have a group here in our region working with our 
roading managers to identify efficiencies and how we can do things better. 
And one of the possible solutions to that is in particular getting sort of a 
centre of excellence around geotech[nology] and bridging structures because 
at the moment there’s probably only a few structural engineers who tend to 
be consultants who have that knowledge about the structures in the region. 
So that Roading Efficiency Group may look at getting the sort of centre of 
excellence set up in the near future and where all the TAs can then say, ‘Hey 
look… can you come out and check out our infrastructure and our structures’. 
Changes in the demographic nature of some territorial local authority areas were also 
likely to have an impact on transport resilience in the future, the Horizons Regional 
Council transport planner said: 
Ratepayer funding bases are declining for a lot of the rural communities. So 
again there’s … a resilience issue there in terms of well how do they resolve 
some of these issues in terms of they’re not getting the ratepayer funding but 
they are getting increased costs where their major spend is, which is 






grappling with. Whether or not it’s amalgamations or things like that. That 
may solve some of those issues, it may create more issues, who knows? 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said lack of resources could also be a 
problem for maintaining the rail network:  
…preventative maintenance is funded primarily by the size of our trains, in 
other words revenue. There is an overall shortfall, see we’re about well into 
what was called the turn-around plan, which is a plan to try and make 
railways self-sustainable. If we were, we’d be one of the few in the world that 
would be self-sustainable. Railways are a very capital-intensive organisation 
… it would be fair to say that even… if everything went according to the 
turnaround plan … we’re going to be a little bit shy of the mark to be fully 
self-funding. That’s funding our own capital replacements as well as 
maintenance, but maintenance is primarily funded out of revenue. 
He added:  
…when I’m talking about preventative maintenance, I’m talking about [when] 
we’ve had a failure, something’s gone beyond its maintenance tolerance, 
we’re not doing an intervention type, reliability type maintenance, we’re still 
a long way away from that. So there’s a proportion of reactive maintenance, 
which is quite high, rather than preventative maintenance. What we do is as 
things wear out we do capital replacements which I suppose in a way could 
be seen as preventative maintenance, but really they’re replacing a life-
expired component of the asset. Because … our asset is a railway line, it’s 
made up of lots of bits and pieces. It’s not like a machine that you can 
predict the life and you replace it at a certain number of hours. There’s so 
many variables that you really condition monitor and then plan replacements 
on condition monitoring. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said there were also issues acquiring funding 
for replacing infrastructure:  
I’ve got bridges, two bridges, one in particular which is an old structure, in 
fact there’s timber dating from 1908 and it just gives me endless grief and it 
is very difficult to fund replacing it. 
However, he also indicated that recently there had been increased funding for 
maintenance compared to previous years:  
I think it would be fair to say that after [the 2004 Manawatu flood] there was 
a dramatic change from ignoring things like drains and culverts which was… 
because railway money is always tight, but it was particularly tight when the 






was really the last years of the previous government ownership before it was 
privatised. Those years really have a lot to answer for because it was in that 
time, that this time of the year [just before Christmas] was always the 
classic, oh there’s no money, send all the diggers away, so all the diggers 
[would] get turned off and that means that none of the drains or the culverts 
would get dealt to and [in the 2004 Manawatu flood] all the chickens came 
home to roost and certainly some of our woes were caused through that lack 
of maintenance money. I think it would be fair to say that after that the 
money was certainly a lot freer for maintenance. We were allowed to do 
maintenance rather than have the accountants tell us that ‘you will not do 
this’, which was good. 
4.2 Services 
The Horizons Regional Council transport planner said public transport services could only 
play a limited role in assisting the movement of people during disruptions, as they were 
largely dependent upon the road network:  
[Public transport] doesn’t play a huge role because … if a road’s closed then 
… trucks, cars, buses aren’t [going to] go anywhere, they can’t do a heck of a 
lot. If I was sort of scraping the bottom of the barrel, the Capital Connection 
could play a bit of a role in getting people from [Palmerston North] to 
Wellington and back if State Highway 1 is closed then that can play a role, 
assuming the rail’s not closed as well. But general day to day I don’t think 
really there’s much of a role that we do play and I probably can’t see too 
much of a role in the future. We’ve got a couple of commuter services say 
from Marton to [Palmerston North] and Levin to [Palmerston North], but as I 
say if the roads are closed then there’s not a lot we can do. 
The Mainfreight branch manager said that although the company utilizes the rail network 
for part of its operations, it had a limited role in assisting the movement of freight during 
the Manawatu Gorge closure:  
There [are] two parts to our business, the first part is the inbound goods to 
the region and… Mainfreight works on a hub and spoke. So basically 
everything is consolidated here at the branch and then distributed throughout 
the region by vehicles. The rail network is limited in terms of its 
infrastructure, so there’s not … a rail siding in Woodville or Pahiatua, so it’s 
not like we can just de-van [move freight from rail containers to other 
vehicles] ... in the likes of Woodville and then distribute from there. 
Everything’s done from a hub here. So a lot of the inbound goods are de-
vanned here, loaded onto vehicles and then moved over for delivery. 






picking up the freight, bring[ing] it back to the hub and then we consolidate 
per destination and then rail from there. So in terms of our… ability to be 
able to service customers in terms of the outbound goods, no effect… but 
certainly inbound… getting goods to the customers… on that east side was 
certainly greatly affected. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said the company could afford to play only a 
limited role in providing passenger rail services, so therefore rail could not play a 
significant role in moving people during disruptions affecting other modes of transport:  
Oh no, we’re not into that sort of transport [passenger transport]. In 
Wellington it’s a public transport thing that’s run by the regional council. And 
of course [in Wellington] it’s funded entirely out of revenue. So it’s bums on 
seats who pay for it. It doesn’t get subsidy from anywhere. And unless the 
bums are on the seats … we can’t afford to run it. And the Northern Explorer 
is perhaps the tourist market, it’s not [public] transport. 
4.3 Economic impacts 
Transport disruptions such as the State Highway 3 Manawatu Gorge closure can have 
significant economic impacts. However, the data paints a nuanced picture. Data provided 
by Palmerston North City Council’s Economic Policy Advisor (Figure 4.1) indicates that 
domestic visitor spending in Palmerston North City and Manawatu District remained 
relatively buoyant throughout the Manawatu Gorge closure. However, there appears to 
have been a slowing in spending in Tararua District, on the eastern side of the gorge. The 
Tararua District Council Manager Strategy and District Development said Woodville 
retailers were particularly affected by a reduction in traffic moving through the town, 
though this was compounded at times by other factors. 
Traffic flow data from the New Zealand Transport Agency (New Zealand Transport 
Agency, 2011) show that the State Highway 3 Manawatu Gorge Road is an important and 
well-utilized link between the Manawatu-Wanganui and eastern areas. The data also show 
that the State Highway 3 Manawatu Gorge route is, in terms of traffic flow and utilisation 
by heavy vehicles, of comparable significance to the other state highways connecting 








Figure 4.1 Quarterly change in domestic visitor spending March 2009 to June 2013 in 
selected areas of New Zealand.  
Source: Palmerston North City Council Economic Policy Advisor, August 5, 2013.  
 
During the interviews, the Destination Manawatu Board Member expressed concern that 
the gorge closure may have dissuaded freight businesses who were considering moving 
operations to the area:  
I think it created a question mark for industries that are potentially looking at 
the Manawatu as a central place for doing distribution, in that suddenly, the 
east-west connection appeared vulnerable. It’s always been vulnerable, but I 
think the scale of this highlighted the potential risks and that the solutions 
appeared to be having a backup that’s climbing over the hills and that’s 
almost accepted as an acceptable alternative. So I think it’s quite damaging. 
One of the things that I believe is that the strategic strength of the Manawatu 
and its economy is its central location and if central location is to be exploited 
the economy here is dependent upon good transport linkages. It becomes 
more important than for any other part of the country, in my view. 
The Mainfreight branch manager said the Manawatu Gorge closure highlighted the 
importance of the route and the inadequacy of the alternate routes:  
[The Manawatu Gorge] is… an important little bit of road and it probably 






went on we sort of realised how much it was impacting not only our business 
but our ability to do business for our customers as well. The … alternative 
[routes were] the biggest problem. It’s not ideal for the sort of heavy traffic 
that needs to go across it and then I think there’s wear and tear problems 
with the road the more the heavy traffic starting using the… alternatives, so 
… operationally it was quite a big impact and again financially to the drivers 
and to the business, it was quite significant as well. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The 2006 to 2010 average traffic flow (both directions) at selected monitoring 
sites around Palmerston North.  







It negatively affected driver productivity and increased costs in a range of areas, the 
Mainfreight branch manager said: 
[The additional time required] was close to an hour at times, close to an 
hour. You do have wear and tear on the gear, but the fuel economy certainly 
plummeted because the truck’s working a lot harder to get up… a [road] 
that’s a lot steeper than what the gorge is, so … all those auxiliary costs to 
the actual unit going across was pretty significant. 
He estimated the additional costs imposed by the disruptions at approximately $20,000 
per week, although there were variations from week to week based on the freight 
volumes being transported. Having a reliable transport network was very important to the 
company: 
It’s huge, it’s what our business is based on. If we haven’t got a road or if we 
haven’t got rail then we’re not moving the freight, and that’s every single 
commodity you can think of, … and it just doesn’t happen if those roads 
aren’t there for whatever reason. 
The Manawatu Gorge remained an area of concern and he believed alternate routes 
needed upgrades:  
It will happen again, it’s not question of if, it’ll be when. And if we want to be 
a lot better prepared for it then … I think the alternatives have to be 
[improved]. Why don’t we start looking at that now rather than wait for it to 
happen again … and … not learn from the mistakes from the first time … and 
delay decision-making or action. 
But the Mainfreight branch manager said that overall the state of the region’s transport 
network was not a barrier to the growth of the freight and distribution sector: 
To be honest we don’t have too many issues. And again … we do cover more 
than the Manawatu Region, we’re covering parts of the Horowhenua … we’re 
as far down as sort of Masterton, Dannevirke on the east, … as far as 
Ohakuhne, Raetahi, National Park going north, and as far as Wanganui out to 
the [west]. So, in general for the Manawatu, generally not a lot of concern 
there in terms of the transport infrastructure… it satisfies the needs at this 
stage. 
He later added: 
I think the only limitations are the businesses themselves, but in terms of the 
infrastructure, no, it’s not limiting. 
The Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer said the closure also had 






It was more … people … just wanted to go home because it was going to take 
a lot longer so they probably didn’t spend time here after work as they 
normally would. There is probably a great deal of visitors that didn’t come 
because of the [Manawatu Gorge] being closed so it would have been easier 
to go either up State Highway 1 or not even go over there … and to be in 
Palmerston North and then try to get to the Hawke’s Bay, I think a lot of 
visitors just went up to Taupo. 
But it was difficult to quantify the economic impacts of the event, she said:  
It was very, very difficult to do that. I mean we did work with [a Palmerston 
North City Council economist]… it was just … too tangible for us to be able to 
… a really good example is the gyms and the restaurants … they did have 
decrease in usage over that time but you can’t say that that was specifically 
[because] of the slip so… 
The Manawatu Chamber of Commerce chief executive officer said that the gorge closure 
also showed that Palmerston North was a viable location for freight and distribution, 
despite the disruption to the gorge route:  
 …  another aspect of that was it proved what a great spot we are logistically 
for getting stuff out because yes we couldn’t get to the Hawke’s Bay, or to 
Napier port, but we can still get to Taranaki, you can still get to Tauranga, we 
can still get to Auckland, so Wellington, I mean it’s not hard. 
4.4 Engineering 
The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said private contractors 
played a key role in responding to natural hazard events that affected the road network:  
…operationally, most of our response capacity exists through our 
maintenance contractors, which is a private contract for maintenance of the 
roading network. So if, for example, there was a road closure … then there’s 
an automatic response. The council has a 24/7 response capability through 
its call centre and … so if say a road was closed, then the first response is 
actually to call our private contract arm out and they deal with the initial 
issue. Now, as and when that happens, council’s roading division acts as the 
owner of the assets and starts making management decisions and 
determines whether other steps in the process need to be done and, 
depending on their scale, then that would depend how we would respond. But 
the 2004 floods that was obviously an ongoing situation. There were Civil 
Defence activations throughout the region. I don’t think Palmerston North 
actually got to a full activation because we weren’t immediately threatened, 






boss, the roading manager, has direct responsibilities under civil defence 
plans so he would be primarily responsible for ensuring contact is made as 
necessary. But … we do rely heavily on our maintenance contractors. And 
there is a little bit of issue in that our maintenance contractor might also hold 
contracts with the state highway. That can occasionally lead to conflict where 
one is given priority over another by the same firm. Basically, they have to 
make rationing choices and… that occasionally needs some monitoring. But 
generally [it] works out that… our level [of] service that we expect is being 
[delivered]. Obviously there’s performance conditions within the contracts to 
ensure that … we’re not left behind, but in a major event obviously there’s 
going to be some constraints on what can be done and how quickly it can be 
done. 
He added: 
Their main driver is safety, but obviously high volume roads such as the state 
highways might be seen as a higher priority than some lower volume roads. 
So … some rational judgements have to be made sometimes. If it’s a back 
country road that’s carrying only a few hundred vehicles a day then it might 
not achieve the same level of priority under an emergency management 
situation. 
He did not expect contractor capacity issues to lead to significant problems: 
… clearly if they need to bring in any extra resources there’s mechanisms for 
them to do that. And this is not a situation that arises often … because these 
are typically rare events that we’re talking about. But obviously one of the 
main issues is the quality of the information that’s available. Obviously [if] 
there’s a bridge out and there’s ready evidence that there’s a clear safety 
issue that would be given a high priority. If there’s a slip blocking part of the 
road well traffic can’t move around the slip and they’ve just got to wait. And 
sending up a truck to deal with that slip there’s obviously going to be a 
response time, but nobody’s going to get hurt if they can’t drive past the 
point, so that might be a lower priority. So generally it’s just common sense 
principles that would occur and in practice it works very well. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager also identified contractor capacity as an 
issue:  
…we learnt very early on in [the 2004 Manawatu floods] that you just 
brought contractors on and start paying them even if you don’t use them 







The Palmerston North City Council road planning team leader said the city’s local road 
network was reasonably resilient as there is a high degree of redundancy in most places:  
….probably one of our biggest strengths is the grid network of the city and 
the fact that we have alternate routes. And you can see that by some of the 
things that happen. [For example] we’ve just dug up the Fitzherbert-
Fergusson intersection in town there, but generally the traffic problems there 
are fairly small because people are already adopting alternative routes to 
avoid that intersection. The nature of our network is that there is spare 
capacity of parallel routes and people will make use of that at times. And it’s 
only those people that absolutely have to go to that area that will continue to 
use it. And so the very nature of our roading network is that it is a 
reasonably resilient network. 
The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager indicated that the lack of redundancy in the 
local rail network had led the company to instead focus on rapidity:  
… the thing with rail is we can’t go around things, so if we have a disruption 
with rail we’re totally off the air, unlike roads where you can go around things 
easily…. 
He added:  
…let’s just say for us there’s more incentive to get things working because 
we’re out of business. We’re not like NZTA, if they’ve got a slip in the gorge it 
doesn’t matter if it’s shut for a year, they’d just [divert traffic] over the 
Saddle Road. If we had a slip in the gorge for a year the company’s crippled, 
absolutely crippled. 
He said Kiwirail had a track record of restoring services after hazard events relatively 
quickly, which he put down to staff skills and innovation:  
There’s a lot of Kiwi ingenuity and a lot of very clever thinking by some very 
clever people that we do have or have access to for disaster recovery. We 
don’t have time for elegantly engineered things, it just has to work. So we do 
have some rail specialised machinery, but that’s becoming rarer and rarer 
now as there’s less and less money, so we’re reliant on trying to come up 
with more off the wall solutions. 
The Palmerston North road planning team leader said current engineering standards were 
appropriate:  
… generally the standards today are much higher than they were in the past 






a better product, however, generally our standards follow the New Zealand 
Standard 4404. We have our own subdivision standards for roads, so new 
developments, no problem, it is being built to standard. Sometimes there will 
be variations on those standards dictated by circumstances. [For example,] if 
a road is catering for potentially a very low volume use, lifestyle block 
subdivisions for example won’t get the intensity of development that 
residential areas will, so the standard can be lower. Things like absence of 
street lighting, footpaths, in those rural areas. Obviously it’s a very different 
environment to what you expect when you get into the urban areas, where in 
the urban areas we’re looking at full residential standards, kerbs, gutters, 
berms, footpaths, streetlights, all of those. So generally we’re following the 
national standards, but some developments, particularly lifestyle-directed 
elements/developments tends to be of a lower standard and generally a 
higher speed limit because of the lower level of development. We’re using 
AUROADS standards for road design when we do upgrades. We’re following 
NZTA best practice by getting safety audits done of all our design work, so 
generally we’re pretty well versed. If you look at a roundabout that was built 
30 years ago in the city and compare it to one that’s built today, it’s a very 
different standard. What we got away with a generation ago we wouldn’t get 
away with today. The downside of that is that there’s generally a much 
higher cost and if anything that can slow down the potential delivery time for 
some of these things. 
4.5 Ecological 
Transport disruptions might have environmental impacts. In the case of the Manawatu 
Gorge closure, the alternate routes are considerably longer, suggesting that overall 
vehicle emissions and fuel consumption would increase if overall traffic flows on this 
transport corridor remained stable. While traffic flow data relating to the closure period 
could not be obtained, it can be inferred that overall traffic flows in this corridor did not 
drop significantly, based on data from the 2004 floods. In the wake of the floods both the 
Manawatu Gorge and Saddle Road were closed, leaving the Pahiatua Track as the only 
remaining route. Approximately 6,000 to 7,000 vehicles used the Pahiatua Track route 
per day after the storm, compared with 1000 vehicles per day in normal conditions 
(Horizons Regional Council, 2004, p. 2) and the annual average daily traffic flow on the 
Manawatu Gorge road was 6,357 vehicles (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2009, p. 30). 
This shows that in 2004 the overall change in the traffic flow in this corridor was relatively 
small, despite the disruption. It is therefore inferred that the 2011 to 2012 closure would 
also not have resulted in a significant reduction in vehicles using the corridor and that 
there was likely to have been an increase in vehicle emissions and fuel consumption, 






The Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager said that for some time the company had 
been utilising ecosystem services to better manage natural hazards that may affect the 
rail network:  
Plantings and things like that are very, very important for water control, 
slope control … we’re pretty well up with that. That’s been business as usual 
since probably the 1930s and ‘40s. 
He also said the company had taken some measures to reduce the potential 
environmental damage from rail accidents:  
…we carry things which are environmentally not nice. One of the biggest 
‘environmentally-not-nices’ would be milk. On the milk trains, the 
locomotives will carry spill kits and things like that. But it’s one of those 
things that’s been identified as quite a big risk [and it is] very, very difficult 
to manage it. 
4.6 Social 
The study sought to explore one key aspect of the social impacts of transport disruptions: 
the impact on health services. The interview with the St John Dannevirke Area Committee 
Chairman primarily explored the impacts of the 2011 to 2012 gorge closure on the 
Dannevrike St John health shuttle service. The chairman said most of the service’s clients, 
including many requiring chemotherapy and dialysis, are transported to medical 
appointments in Palmerston North. The gorge closure had several impacts on the service, 
including increased overall costs due to wear and tear on vehicles and increased fuel use:  
I would say it [the cost] would be about 10 per cent more… it costs us now 
about $35,000 a year… to run it and with the depreciation on that it would go 
up to about $60,000 I would say. So you put another 10 to 15 per cent on 
top of that for going over the gorge. 
It also affected clients:  
…it was harder on our clients… the going over the Saddle [Road] so lots of 
times we went round through the Pahiatua Track, but that’s not really much 
better. And also … it took a lot longer getting over there. And so therefore we 
had to start off a lot earlier in the morning and so people were sitting in the 
buses longer and therefore they were a bit … grumpier. And winding up over 
there if you got behind a truck or something like that … and you just imagine 
after a procedure in the hospital and all you want to do is get home and then 
you have to sit in a … van and wind up all over those hills. 







Lots of times we wouldn’t send [them] back for a second trip. Now they come 
back in the morning, the 6 o’clock one, the one that leaves here at half past 
5, 6 o’clock will come back at about 8 and do a second trip, but lots of times 
we wouldn’t let [them] do a second trip, we’d put someone else on, because 
it would be just a lot more stress on [them]. 
Despite the additional cost and time needed to operate the service as a result of the 
closure, it did not receive any additional funding or support from central government or 
local authorities, the St John Dannevirke Area Committee Chairman said. However, the 
community supported the service with donations and he said that there was nothing that 
central government or local authorities could have done to make coping with the closure 
easier for the service.  
4.7 Summary  
The data shows that the institutions responsible for managing the Manawatu-Wanganui 
Region’s transport networks have systems in place to identify sections of the transport 
network that are vulnerable to natural hazards. They have also demonstrated that they 
can collaborate with one another effectively and they have learned from past disruptions. 
There are, however some issues around accessing funding for some projects to enhance 
resilience. In terms of services, the data shows the road network plays a vital role in the 
movement of people and goods in the region and that other modes, such as rail, can only 
play a limited supporting role during disruptions due to the nature of the rail network and 
the way it is financed. The economic data suggests that transport disruptions can have an 
impact on the regional economy, though it is difficult to quantify this precisely. The data 
also indicates that key figures in the local business community do not see the state of the 
region’s transport infrastructure as a major barrier to economic growth. The data on 
engineering resilience shows that private contractors play an important role in restoring 
transport networks after disruptions. It also shows that managers of different networks 
utilize the network’s inherent strengths or staff capacity to facilitate recovery from 
disruptions. The data also shows that transport infrastructure is important in meeting 
social needs, particularly for those in the adjoining Tararua District. Transport disruptions 
such as the Manawatu Gorge closure can also have environmental consequences, such as 
increased emissions and fuel consumption. Some efforts have been made to utilize 







The data presented in the previous chapter have shown some of the impacts that 
disruptions to Manawatu-Wanganui Region’s transport network can have. Attention will 
now be turned to measuring the resilience of the region’s transport infrastructure utilizing 
the Transport Resilience Indicator Framework. Each of the dimensions of the RIF will be 
considered in turn. 
5.1 Institutional indicators 
The institutions responsible for managing the region’s transport network have effective 
means of identifying vulnerabilities in the network. These efforts indicate that the ongoing 
risk of landslides and rockfall in the Manawatu Gorge State Highway 3 route makes it the 
most significant resilience issue facing the region’s road network. The Whirokino Trestle is 
another key part of the region’s transport network which is currently vulnerable. Whilst 
there clearly are vulnerabilities in some of the Manawatu’s road and rail infrastructure, it 
must be acknowledged that some work has been carried out to make many of these areas 
more resilient. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2004 floods posed a stern 
challenge to the region’s transport infrastructure, and work has been carried out to 
strengthen weak areas of the network since then. Some infrastructure failed, such as the 
Saddle Road bridge over the Pohangina River, near Ashhurst, and was subsequently 
replaced (Galloway, 2006), improving robustness as a by-product of replacing such 
structures with newer ones. The Saddle Road was also upgraded during the Manawatu 
Gorge closure, with a further $4.5 million upgrade planned (New Zealand Transport 
Agency, 2013c), improving this alternate route to the Manawatu Gorge. Work is also 
currently under way to consider a replacement for the Whirokino Trestle. 
There is an appropriate degree of collaboration between the institutions responsible for 
managing the region’s transport networks. Forums such as the Regional Transport 
Committee and Engineering Lifelines Group enable key institutions to work collaboratively 
on resilience issues. There are also less formal, but nevertheless important, relationships 
between council officers which allow for information sharing. However, the business 
people interviewed expressed some concern that they had not been informed of progress 
on restoring damaged transport networks and had not been able to put their concerns to 
some of the key figures involved. 
Procuring funding for resilience-enhancing projects is also an area of concern. Funding is 
already difficult to source in some areas, such as for new capital roading projects, as 






Potential changes to the funding regime, particularly the FAR review, could further limit 
the resources that territorial local authorities have to maintain and improve their local 
road networks. This is a particular concern for territorial local authorities with lengthy 
roading networks and relatively small populations and rates bases. This raises concerns 
about the future resilience of the local roading network.  
5.2 Services indicators  
The data suggested that the road network is the most important network for moving 
people and goods in the region. Public transport plays a very limited role in facilitating the 
movement of people in a hazardous event as it is entirely road-based. Kiwirail plays 
virtually no role in this regard because, due its funding arrangements, it does not offer 
public transport services within the region. Therefore, any disruption to the road network 
necessarily means that public transport services will be affected too.  
The road network plays an essential role in the movement of freight. At times rail has 
provided an alternate means of transport during disruptions to key roads, such as during 
the 2011-2012 Manawatu Gorge closure (albeit in a limited fashion). But the region’s rail 
network is mostly focused on long-distance freight movements and the rail network and 
infrastructure is not well placed to play a supporting role during such disruptions. 
5.3 Economic indicators 
Transport disruptions such as the 2011-2012 Manawatu Gorge closure have wide 
economic impacts. Although the data indicate such effects appeared to be reasonably well 
contained, they did highlight the necessity for building resilient transport networks. 
Firstly, the region’s freight and distribution sector is particularly affected by transport 
disruptions. The closure of the Manawatu Gorge, for example, meant that freight trucks 
had to be redirected to a longer route, which significantly increased their operation costs. 
However, the state of the region’s transport infrastructure does not appear to be a 
significant barrier to the continuing growth of this sector. Secondly, although Palmerston 
North City and Manawatu District did not experience any noticeable reduction in domestic 
visitor numbers during the period of the Gorge closure, Woodville retailers, who are on 
the other side of the transport corridor, did report weaker traffic volume. Nonetheless, the 
reduction could have been affected by other factors, hence no formal conclusion can be 
drawn. Lastly, there are also other possible, albeit unconfirmed, impacts on the local 
economy due to the road closure in the Manawatu Gorge. For example, commuters who 
used the Manawatu Gorge route might have spent less time in Palmerston North after 






are required to confirm and accurately quantify the impacts of hazard events on the 
region’s road network and economy.  
5.4 Engineering indicators  
This research has shown that road and rail operators face different engineering challenges 
in responding to hazards. The region’s road network has a high degree of redundancy, 
most roads having alternate routes to help cope with disruptions. In terms of road 
maintenance and repair, most of the works are carried out by private contractors. 
Although these contractors have a key role in responding to transport disruptions, it 
appears that they sometimes lack adequate capacity to deal with disruptions in an 
efficient manner. Due to the fact that many private contractors involved in local roading 
works are also responsible for state highways, conflicts occasionally arise because the 
contractors have to prioritise between different roading demands. Although prioritisation 
of conflict goals is a relatively straightforward process and rarely becomes a major issue, 
it would be prudent to further examine contractors’ capacity to deal with large-scale 
events affecting a broad geographical area.  
On the other hand, Kiwirail notes that in responding to disruptions caused by hazards, 
rapidity overrides redundancy. This is because the rail network often lacks alternate 
routes, which makes the speed of recovery of a damaged route the top concern. 
Contractor capacity could also potentially be an issue for rail maintenance: the interview 
with the Kiwirail Palmerston North area manager suggested that Kiwirail may have to 
compete with road transport authorities for contractors in the aftermath of a hazardous 
event. In addition to private contractors, Kiwirail also recognises the importance of human 
capital and innovation in ensuring the speedy restoration of disrupted rail lines. Overall, 
the data suggest asset managers are using modern engineering standards and adapt their 
management appropriately to reflect the nature of the network they manage and its 
strengths and weaknesses.  
5.5 Ecological indicators  
The data show that the 2011 to 2012 Manawatu Gorge closure is likely to have had a 
range of environmental impacts, such as increased emissions and fuel consumption, 
though it is difficult to quantify them. These impacts would vary depending upon the 
location of the disruption and the length of detour routes. The data also show that some 
efforts have been made to utilize the ecosystems services benefits of planting to reduce 
the threat of natural hazards to transport infrastructure.  Kiwirail has also taken measures 






by installing spill kits on trains to help prevent milk on cargo trains from spilling onto the 
ground or into waterways. 
5.6 Social indicators  
Transport network disruptions inevitably affect the movement of people and their access 
to social services, employment and amenities. This study looked at the impact of the 
2011 to 2012 Manawatu Gorge closure on a health shuttle service. It found that although 
the closure led to increased operation costs and inconvenience for the service operators 
as well as users, the service was able to absorb the impacts of the closure thanks to the 
support of volunteers and the community. This highlights the need to build social capital 
as a means to increase community resilience to hazards.  
5.7 Summary 
When assessed using the six dimensions of the RIF, the strengths and weaknesses of 
Manawatu-Wanganui Region’s transport network are revealed. The assessment shows 
that the institutions responsible for managing the region’s transport network can 
effectively identify vulnerabilities in the network and collaborate and learn from past 
disruptions. However, concern remains over the level of funding for maintaining and 
upgrading the region’s transport networks, particularly the local road networks managed 
by territorial local authorities with large networks and small rates bases. Transport 
services in the region are strongly dependent on the roading network, with rail playing a 
limited role. This means there are limited alternatives during roading network disruptions. 
A reliable transport network is important for the region’s economy: however, despite the 
impacts of the 2011 to 2012 Manawatu Gorge closure, it would appear that the region’s 
transport network is reasonably robust and does not impede economic growth. Private 
contractors play a crucial role in restoring services after a disruption, and their capacity to 
deal with major and widespread events warrants further investigation. Transport 
disruptions also have environmental impacts, but these are difficult to quantify. Lastly, a 
case study of the response of a local health shuttle service has shown Transport 
disruptions also have environmental impacts, but these are difficult to quantify. Lastly, a 
case study of the response of a local health shuttle service has shown an example of how 
a community service was able to adapt and respond appropriately to transport disruptions 







This research project sought an answer to the question: How resilient is the road and rail 
infrastructure in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region? The question is important as there 
have been a number of significant disruptions to the region’s transport network in recent 
times, with economic, social and environmental consequences. Therefore, in the 
Manawatu-Wanganui Region, as in many other areas, methods of measuring the 
resilience of transport infrastructure would be useful tools for decision-makers to 
determine priorities for investment.  
Due to the multifaceted nature of resilience this project utilized a holistic method of 
assessing transport resilience: the Transport Resilience Indicator Framework (RIF). The 
RIF explored six dimensions of resilience: institutional, services, economic, engineering, 
ecological and social factors. That exploration identified strengths and weaknesses in the 
region’s transport network and the way it is managed. The key area of concern identified 
was the availability of funding for resilience-enhancing projects. That area of concern 
might become even more significant, particularly for territorial authorities with larger 
roading networks and smaller rates bases, if funding is reduced as a result of the FAR 
review.  
Other areas could be explored to strengthen this work: the research has identified some 
of them, such as assessing the capacity of private contractors to respond to natural 
hazard events of varying magnitudes. The RIF also envisages the use of indicators based 
on quantitative data, in addition to qualitative data. Perhaps a fuller picture of transport 
resilience in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region could be built with the addition of 
quantitative indicators. One method of achieving this could this could be to adopt a multi-
disciplinary approach, drawing on expertise, methods and perspectives from related 
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